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the
Republican-controlledstate accountedfor more than a quarter
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States. Marshalinghundreds ofpublic information requests, the
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the ballot, the ballots castfor its remarkable bipartisanvictory,
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restored, and the outstandingfines and fees that still prevent
most people with felony convictionsfrom voting. PartI offers a
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limitedpartisan consequences of restoring the right to vote to
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INTRODUCTION

In 1974, on the eve of the era of mass incarceration, the Supreme Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment gave states an "affirmative sanction" to
disenfranchise those convicted of a crime. 1 In the years since the Court's
decision in Richardson v. Ramirez, the number of people unable to vote because

of a criminal conviction swelled from less than two million to more than six

1. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) ("[T]he exclusion of felons from the vote
has an affirmative sanction in § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment."). The Court's summary affirmance
of a challenge to North Carolina's felon disenfranchisement statute during the prior term foreshadowed
its decision in Ramirez. See Fincher v. Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117, 119 (M.D.N.C. 1972) ("Putting it
positively, we think § 1 must be read in light of § 2, and, so read, denial of the franchise to felons is
specifically excepted from the Equal Protection Clause contained in § 1."), aff'd, 411 U.S. 961 (1973)
(mem.). The Court had also previously sanctioned in dicta the practice of disenfranchising persons
convicted of a crime. See Green v. Bd. of Elections of City of N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967)
(collecting cases). For example, fifteen years prior, in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of
Elections, a unanimous court upheld North Carolina's literacy test and noted that "[r]esidence
requirements, age, [and a] previous criminal record . . are obvious examples indicating factors which a
State may take into consideration in determining the qualifications of voters." 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
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million. 2 Felon disenfranchisement also became partisan. 3 While Democratic
states have liberalized their laws, Republican states, often in the South, remain
bastions of disenfranchisement. 4 By 2016, Republican-controlled Florida
accounted for more than one-quarter of the entire country's disenfranchised
citizens.5

Because Ramirez suggests that "the facial validity of felon
disenfranchisement may be absolute," 6 substantially reducing the scope of
disenfranchisement depends on building bipartisan coalitions in states like
Florida, including addressing the expectation that expanding the right to vote

will dramatically benefit Democrats. Yet even if these political coalitions can
come together, the many collateral consequences of a criminal conviction can
complicate efforts to expand the right to vote. As the number of people with a
criminal conviction has grown, so has the court-ordered assessment of fines,
fees, and restitution. 7 In its wake, an emerging issue is whether the payment of
these legal financial obligations (LFOs) is required to vote, particularly when a
state restores voting rights upon the general requirement that an individual
complete the terms of their sentence. 8
This Article focuses on a 2018 ballot initiative, known as Amendment 4,
which sought to end lifetime disenfranchisement in Florida. It marshals hundreds
of public information requests to introduce four novel datasets that cover the
hundreds of thousands of petitions collected to put the initiative on the ballot, the
millions of ballots cast for its victory, the voter registration records of people

2.
See CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, RYAN LARSON & SARAH SHANNON, SENT'G PROJECT, 6
MILLION LOST VOTERS: STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT 9 fig.5 (2016),

https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/6-Million-Lost-Voters.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/T2L3-5JN5] (reporting the estimated number disenfranchised for selected years,
1960-2016); see also NAT'L RSCH. COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED

STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 39 fig.2-3, 41 fig.2-4, 43 fig.2-5 (Jeremy Travis,
Bruce Western & Steve Redburn eds., 2014) (showing an increase in imprisonment beginning in the
1970s and vastly accelerating in the 1980s and 1990s).
3. See Jason Belmont Conn, Felon Disenfranchisement Laws: Partisan Politics in the
Legislatures, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 495, 499 (2005) (arguing that "partisan politics drives changes to
the state laws governing felon voter eligibility").
4. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 8 fig.4 (displaying a cartogram of total
disenfranchisement rates by state); MORGAN MCLEOD, SENT'G PROJECT, EXPANDING THE VOTE: TWO
DECADES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT REFORM (2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp[https://perma.cc/8E2M-QBNN]
content/uploads/2018/10/Expanding-the-Vote-1997-2018.pdf
(cataloging reforms by state and year).
5. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 15 tbl.3 (reporting estimates of disenfranchisement by
state, with Florida having about 1.6 million disenfranchised citizens of the 6.1 million nationwide).
6. Farrakhanv. Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304, 1314 (E.D. Wash 1997).
7.
NEEDED

See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-01-664, CRIMINAL DEBT: OVERSIGHT AND ACTIONS
TO
ADDRESS
DEFICIENCIES
IN
COLLECTION
PROCESSES
9
(2001),

https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-01-664.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EQE6-SK4J]
(explaining
that
outstanding criminal debt rose from $260 million in 1985 to about $13 billion in 2001).
8. See Beth Colgan, Wealth-Based Penal Disenfranchisement,72 VAND. L. REV. 55, 66-67
(2019) (explaining that "the relevant laws . . in many jurisdictions use vague language in which penal
disenfranchisement and restoration requirements are hidden").
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with felony convictions, and the outstanding fines and fees that cause them to
remain disenfranchised.
The Article proceeds chronologically, from the ballot initiative to its
partisan implementation and finally to the ensuing litigation. It makes three
observations about the role of partisanship, poverty, and equality in the
restoration of voting rights. First, the campaign for Amendment 4 won a
remarkable bipartisan victory, drawing Republican support from poorer and

more racially diverse neighborhoods. Second, expanding the right to vote to
people with felony convictions has smaller partisan consequences than the
typical politics of reform would suggest. Third, because the vast majority of
people with felony convictions owe fines and fees, the vast majority still remain
disenfranchised, likely too poor to restore their right to vote. Together, these
empirical lessons from the campaign for Amendment 4 suggest that the debate
around felon disenfranchisement should be recast: as a question of citizenship,
rather than partisanship; and as an issue intertwined with, not separate from, the
criminal justice system.
Part I explains the success of the ballot initiative. The campaign for
Amendment 4 promised to reorder the landscape of felon disenfranchisement by
amending the state constitution to replace lifetime disenfranchisement with
automatic restoration of the right to vote "upon completion of all terms of
sentence." 9 In some ways, the campaign was typical of recent efforts at felon
disenfranchisement reform, drawing heavily on civil rights organizations and
Democratic support for its fundraising and petition collection.'

0

In order to

amend the state constitution, though, the campaign needed to win the support of
a supermajority of the electorate, which necessarily included a substantial share
of Republicans." The electoral constraint forced the campaign to depoliticize
disenfranchisement. The campaign recognized that the typical focus on racial
disparities in discussions of felon disenfranchisement left little room for the
support of white, more likely Republican, communities. The racial framework
also likely inflated the public's sense of how many disenfranchised people are
African American. This is critical because, as Part II will show, the partisan
consequences of felon disenfranchisement are largely tied to the racial
composition

9.
OF

of who stands to regain the vote.

The campaign instead

ConstitutionalAmendment Petition Formfor Voting RestorationAmendment, FLA. DEP' T
STATE,
DIV.
OF
ELECTIONS
(Oct.
31,
2014),

https://dos.elections.iyflorida.com/initiatives/fulltext/pdf/64388-1.pdf

[https://perma.cc/48UP-SALT]

[hereinafter Voting RestorationAmendment].

10. See infra Table 2 (reporting the number of petitions signed by registered voters to put
Amendment 4 on the ballotby party and by race); Table 3 (same butby precinct income and by precinct
race).
11. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(e) (requiring that constitutional amendments by initiative have
60 percent support to take effect); infra Table 2 (reporting that, as of November 2018, approximately
one-third of registered voters in Florida were registered Democrats, one-third were registered
Republicans, and one-third were independent).
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deemphasized race and focused on the concept of redemption to cultivate
Republican support.

Remarkably, no political committee ever registered to oppose Amendment
4. Beyond the narrative choice, this lack of organized opposition was in large
part because the campaign made a series of tradeoffs about the scope of reform.
The campaign took a cautious approach, strategically excluding those convicted
of murder or sexual offenses.' 2 Critically, the campaign also proposed restoring
voting rights upon the "completion of all terms of sentence" and did not
specifically address the status of outstanding fines, fees, or restitution in the text
of the amendment. While the campaign's early focus groups showed that limiting
the scope of reform polled better, the campaign may also have been unaware of
the magnitude of LFOs and the number of people potentially affected.13
Ultimately, the campaign told the Florida Supreme Court during the ballot
approval process that the restoration of voting rights would require the payment
of fines, fees, and restitution as part of the completion of all terms of sentence.
The campaign's strategy worked. Amendment 4 passed with the support of
nearly 65 percent of voters, including 40 percent of Republicans.' 4 The campaign
was particularly successful at getting Republican support in lower-income

areas.' 5 And even with its deemphasis of race, the campaign did not lose its core
Black support.16

Despite Amendment 4's watershed victory, partisan politics eventually
engulfed the ballot initiative's implementation. While Florida now automatically
restores the right to vote "upon completion of all terms of sentence," 7 the state
legislature ultimately defined "completion of all terms of sentence" to explicitly
include the full payment of fines, fees, and restitution.' 8 Every Republican
legislator voted for the legislation; every Democrat opposed it. 19
Part II gathers novel data on the political behavior of people with felony
convictions to show that this sharp partisan divide is at odds with the empirical
evidence. It focuses on two groups of people with felony convictions-first,
those who registered to vote after Amendment 4 went into effect in January 2019
12. See Voting RestorationAmendment, supra note 9 ("No person convicted of murder or a
felony sexual offense shall be qualified to vote until restoration of civil rights.").
13. See infra Part I.C.2 (discussing the campaign's strategy in formulating the text of the
amendment, including focus groups which addressed fines and fees); infra note 188 (discussing the
campaign's awareness of the magnitude of LFOs and the number of people affected).
14. See infra Figure 4 (showing the vote choice on Amendment 4 by vote for either the
Democratic or Republican candidate for governor or senator based on ballot-level data).
15. See infra Figure 6 (showing that the percentage of Republican voters supporting
Amendment 4 is highest when the estimated household income of a precinct is lowest).
16. See infra Figure 7 (showing that the percentage of Democratic voters supporting
Amendment 4 increases with the share of Black registered voters in a precinct).
17. FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(a).
18.
S. 7066, 2019 Leg., Regular Sess. (Fla. 2019), codified at Fla. Stat. § 98.0751(2).
19. See Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1236 (N.D. Fla. 2020) (describing the "straight
party-line vote"), rev 'd andvacatedsub nom. Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 2020)
(en banc).
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but before the implementing legislation went into effect in July; and second,
those who registered to vote after being automatically granted clemency as part
of a 2007 executive reform. Together, the registrations of people with felony
convictions make clear that the expected partisan consequences of felon
disenfranchisement reform should be revised. For one, the view that felon
disenfranchisement reform is a boon to Democrats is a distinctly racial onemost people with felony convictions are not Black, and these other individuals
are more likely to register as Republicans. 20 For another, people with felony
convictions are consistently unlikely to vote. 2 ' For both reasons, Republicans

need not fear a "blue wave" from the restoration of voting rights. 22
Finally, Part III assesses the role of fines and fees in perpetuating felon
disenfranchisement. In general, it has been difficult to document the growth and
scope of LFOs because of the decentralized nature of the criminal justice system.
Part III helps to fill this gap by collecting sentencing records from twenty-seven
of Florida's sixty-seven counties. The available data paint a stark portrait: the
median person convicted of at least one felony was assessed more than $1,000
in fines and fees; about three-quarters of all people with felony convictions,
including even more African Americans with felony convictions, currently have
outstanding debt; and, based on the pattern of payments, most people appear
unable-not unwilling-to pay.23

Various civil rights organizations immediately sought to enjoin the
Republican

legislation

requiring

the

payment

of LFOs

to

vote

as

unconstitutional.24 But their effort faced a substantial doctrinal hurdle-after all,
it was the very deference of courts to state felon disenfranchisement regimes that
led to reform in Florida taking the form of a ballot initiative.
The plaintiffs' hopes for judicial relief largely depended on presenting
substantially similar empirical evidence about the burden of LFOs. Their effort
was initially successful. After a limited preliminary injunction25 was affirmed on
appeal, 26 Judge Robert Hinkle of the Northern District of Florida issued a historic
permanent injunction. Judge Hinkle held that Florida's law was unconstitutional
as applied to people unable to pay their LFOs, and further, that conditioning
voting rights on the payment of court fees amounted to an unconstitutional poll

20. See infra Figure 8 (showing the party affiliation of persons with felony convictions).
21. See infra Table 5 (showing the turnout of persons with felony convictions).
22. See infra Table 6 (showing the estimated counterfactual Democratic gain in Florida's 2016
presidential election, if all of the people in Florida who had completed any period of prison or
supervision were eligible to vote, is less than President Trump's margin of victory).
23. See infra Table 9 (estimating the amount of fines and fees assessed in felony cases per person
as well as the percent with a remaining balance); Figures 12 & 13 (showing when individuals pay fines
and fees overtime, if they ever do).
24. See Jonesv. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d at 1203-05 (describing how five lawsuits eventually
consolidated).
25. Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284 (N.D. Fla. 2019).
26. Jones v. Governor of Fla., 950 F.3d 795 (11th Cir. 2020).
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tax.27 But the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, ultimately "relegated [the district
court's empirical assessment] to the dustbin" and vacated the injunction.

28

As a

result, Florida continues to disenfranchise more citizens than any other state, 29
highlighting how far similar campaigns need to go to create a truly inclusive
democracy.
I.
THE WATERSHED VOTE: ESTIMATING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR REFORM

The campaign for Amendment 4 was launched by a group of people unable
to vote as a response to Florida's drastic scale of disenfranchisement. Since the
2000 election first called national attention to the issue, the estimated number of
people disenfranchised in the state had ballooned from about eight hundred
thousand to more than 1.6 million. 30 While many other states had liberalized
their laws, 3 ' attempts at legislative reform in Florida from Black and Democratic
lawmakers routinely failed in the Republican-led state legislature. 32 Attempts at
judicial reform in the state fared no better. 33
Initially, executive reform showed some promise. In 2006, Charlie Crist,
the then-Republican candidate for governor, backed the automatic restoration of
voting rights for people with felony convictions. After his election, Florida
granted clemency between 2007 and 2011 to about one hundred fifty thousand

people previously convicted of a felony. 34 But the executive reform did not last.
At the end of his term, Crist left the Republican Party, first to become an
Independent and then a Democrat.35 His successor, Republican Governor Rick

27. See Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d at 1250-51.
28. See Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016, 1066 (11th Cir. 2020) (enbanc) (Jordan, J.,
dissenting).
29. See CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, RYAN LARSON, SARAH SHANNON & ARLETH PULIDO-NAVA,
SENT'G PROJECT, LOCKED OUT 2020: ESTIMATES OF PEOPLE DENIED VOTING RIGHTS DUE TO A

FELONY
CONVICTION
16
tbl.3
(2020),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/10/Locked-Out-2020.pdf [https://penna.cc/9DTM-GVGR] (reporting estimates
of disenfranchised individuals with felony convictions by state).
30.

See JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT

AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 275 tbl.A8.1 (2008) (reporting 827,207 disenfranchised citizens in
Florida as of the 2000 presidential election); UGGEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 15 tbl.3 (estimating
1,686,318 disenfranchised citizens in Florida as of 2016).
31.
See MCLEOD, supra note 4, at 4 (cataloging reforms by state and year).
32. See, e.g., Expert Report of J. Morgan Kousser, Ph.D. at app. 114 tbl.7, Jones v. DeSantis,
462 F. Supp. 1196 (No. 4:19-cv-300), 2020 WL 3130149 [hereinafter Kousser Report] (listing Florida
bills and resolutions on the rights of people with felony convictions, 1998-2018).
33. See, e.g., Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1223-25 (11th Cir. 2005) (enbanc)
(concluding that "Florida's felon disenfranchisement provision is constitutional because it was
substantively altered and reenacted in 1968 in the absence of any evidence of racial bias.").
34. See Hand v. Scott, 285 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1310 (N.D. Fla. 2018), vacatedand remandedsub
nom. Hand v. DeSantis, 946 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2020) (summarizing the restoration of voting rights in
Florida over time).
35. See Associated Press, ChangingAffiliation Again, Former Governorof FloridaBecomes a
Democrat, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/us/politics/charlie-cristformer-florida-governor-joins-democratic-party.html [https://perma.cc/LMS6-88GA].
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Scott, immediately rescinded Crist's policy when he took office in 2011. Scott
instituted new rules that required each person who had completed all prison,
probation, and parole requirements to wait a minimum of five additional years
before applying to be considered for clemency. 36 During the next eight years,
from 2011 to 2018, only about three thousand people successfully regained their
right to vote. 37

About six months before the vote on Amendment 4, a federal district court
judge held that Florida's executive clemency process had become so partisan as
to be unconstitutional. 38 To Judge Mark Walker, Florida's seesawing policy
from Crist to Scott was an example of how the "spigot [of voting rights] is turned
on or off depending on whether politicians perceive they will benefit from the
expansion or contraction of the electorate." 39
In fact, there are many examples of Republican politicians describing their
opposition to even modest efforts to restore voting rights to people with felony

convictions in terms of its expected partisan consequences. In Alabama, the
chairman of the state Republican Party once explained his opposition to reform
in simple terms: "As frank as I can be," he said at the time, "we're opposed to it
because felons don't tend to vote Republican." 40 In Iowa, an executive order by
a Democratic governor41 led a former Republican governor of the state to remark
that reform "looks like a very political move. All of the sudden, you're just going
to make fifty thousand people eligible to vote." 42 When that former Republican
governor won office again, he reversed the reform hours after being sworn in. 43
In the same vein, the Republican leadership in Virginia's state legislature
labelled the Democratic governor's attempt at reform "a transparent effort to win
votes." 44 The state legislature successfully sued the governor in state court.45 For

36. See Hand v. Scott, 285 F. Supp. 3d at 1293 (citing Fla. R. Exec. Clemency § 9(A)(4)).
37. See id. at 1310.
38. See id at 1299-1304 (holding Florida's partisan clemency process violates the First
Amendment's ban on viewpoint discrimination); id at 1306-08 (holding that it also violates the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause).
39. Id at 1310.
40. Shaila Dewan, In Alabama, A Fightto Regain Voting Rights Some FelonsNever Lost, N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
2,
2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/02/us/02felons.html
[https://penna.cc/6UQW-BCRU].
41. See Iowa Exec. Order No. 42, 28 Iowa Admin. Bull. 218 (Aug. 3, 2005) (restoring the right
to vote to individuals who had completed prison, probation, and parole).
42. Todd Dorman, Former Governor Criticizes Vilsack's Voting Rightsfor Felons Decision,
QUAD-CiTY TIMES (June 21, 2005), https://qctimes.com/news/state-and-regional/fonner-govemorcriticizes-vilsack-s-voting-rights-for-felons-decision/article_d4133c91-be2f-506f-ba487acefb5ee2e0.html [https://perma.cc/QMM8-N4DV].
43. See Iowa Exec. Order No. 70, 33 Iowa Admin. Bull. 1165 (Feb. 9, 2011) (reversing Iowa
Exec. Order 42).
44. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Erik Eckholm, Virginia GovernorRestores Voting Rights to Felons,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/23/us/govemor-terry-mcauliffevirginia-voting-rights-convicted-felons.html [https://perma.cc/82V8-GR69].
45. See Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E.2d 706 (Va. 2016) (invalidating the governor's effort as
exceeding the gubernatorial clemency power).
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these same reasons, Kentucky's felon disenfranchisement policy recently
changed a total of three times in four years, depending on the party of the
governor. 46

To expand the restoration of voting rights, the campaign for Amendment 4
proposed amending the state constitution to provide that "voting rights shall be
restored upon completion of all terms of sentence," rather than at the governor's
mercy. 47 Precisely because of the expected Republican opposition, Hillary
Clinton's presidential campaign reportedly did not want the amendment to
appear on the 2016 ballot. 48

'

For their initiative to make the ballot and become law, the campaign needed
to clear three electoral thresholds. First, it needed to initially collect about one
hundred thousand petitions from registered voters before the Florida Supreme
Court would consider whether the proposed ballot language met state
constitutional and statutory standards. 49 Second, it needed to ultimately collect
about one million petitions to actually qualify for the ballot. 50 Third, it needed to
garner 60 percent of all votes cast to become law.5
The different thresholds suggested that the campaign needed the support of
three overlapping constituencies: a small donor class to fund the effort; a medium
number of voters to sign the petition necessary to qualify for the ballot; and a

46. See Ky. Exec. Order No. 2015-871 (Nov. 15, 2015) (expanding right to vote); Ky. Exec.
Order No. 2015-052 (Dec. 22, 2015) (rescinding expansion); Ky. Exec. Order No. 2019-003 (Dec. 12,
2019) (reinstating expansion).
47. Compare Voting RestorationAmendment, supra note 9 (providing for automatic restoration
of voting rights), with FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8(a) ("[T]he governor may . . with the approval of two
members of the cabinet, grant full or conditional pardons, restore civil rights, commute punishment, and
remit fines and forfeitures for offenses."). A state constitutional amendment was necessary because of
an earlier decision by the Florida Supreme Court limiting the power of the legislature to restore voting
rights. In 1974, during the same year the Supreme Court upheld lifetime disenfranchisement in
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974), the state legislature enacted a bill for the automatic
restoration of voting rights immediately upon "discharge[] from parole or release[] . . without
parole .... " Advisory Op. of Governor C.R., 306 So. 2d 520, 520 (Fla. 1975). However, the state
supreme court ultimately invalidated the reform, holding that it "constitute [d] a clear infringement upon
the constitutional power of the Governor to restore civil rights." Id. at 521.
48.

See DESMOND MEADE, LET MY PEOPLE VOTE: MY BATTLE TO RESTORE THE CIVIL

RIGHTS OF RETURNING CITIZENS 111 (2020) ("[T]hey calculated that it was an issue that would be
decided along partisan lines. They believed that Republicans would be dead set against it, and that would
rally turnout of people who would also vote for their candidate for president.").
49. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 15.21(3) (2018) (amended 2020) (threshold for initiative to qualify
for 2018 election is "equal to 10 percent of the number of electors statewide and in at least one-fourth
of the congressional districts required"); FLA. DEP'T OF STATE, DIV. OF ELECTIONS, 2018 INITIATIVE
PETITION

HANDBOOK

8

(2018),

https://fldoswebumbmcoprod.blob.core.windows.net/media/697659/initiative-petition-handbook2018-election-cycle-eng.pdf [https://penna.cc/QY7H-A9KV] [hereinafter INITIATIVE PETITION
HANDBOOK] (reporting the threshold per congressional district to qualify for the November 2018 ballot).
50. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (threshold is "equal to eight percent of the votes cast in each of
such districts respectively and in the state as a whole in the last preceding election in which presidential
electors were chosen"); INITIATIVE PETITION HANDBOOK, supra note 49, at 8 (detailing the threshold
requirement of at least 766,200 petitions statewide to qualify for the November 2018 ballot).
51. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(e).
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supermajority of actual voters, including many registered Republicans. Part I

introduces three new datasets, based on public records requests to each of
Florida's sixty-seven counties, to track who contributed to the campaign, who
signed the petition, and which voters supported the initiative.
A.

Donors

The campaign for Amendment 4 was the product of more than a decade of
organizing by the Florida Rights Restoration Coalition and its president
Desmond Meade.52 The campaign registered its official political action
committee, formally known as Floridians for a Fair Democracy, in October 2014;

it submitted the proposed ballot language that same month. 53 Although the
campaign often struggled to raise money, it ultimately attracted a core group of

liberals and Democrats to finance the effort.
In its first year, the campaign raised little in terms of direct contributions.
It principally relied on in-kind donations54 from three progressive groups to help
with the petition drive: the ACLU of Florida, the Brennan Center for Justice, and
Faith in Florida, a faith-based community organizing group. By the end of 2015,

though, the campaign had collected only about 5 percent of the necessary
petitions to qualify for the ballot. 5 The initial lack of funding explains why it
ultimately took the campaign about three years to collect the first half of the
necessary petitions, then only four months to collect the rest. 56
Figure 1 charts the cumulative direct contributions to the campaign,57 from
when it began in late 2014 to when it eventually qualified for the ballot in early
2018.58 Each point represents an additional direct contribution by a particular
donor on a particular day. The points are semitransparent, making it easier to

distinguish overlapping donations. Significant donations are labelled by donor.

52. See MEADE, supra note 48, at 57-62, 65 (describing the history and role of the Florida
Rights Restoration Coalition in the campaign for Amendment 4).
53. See Floridiansfor aFairDemocracy,Inc.,Statement of OrganizationofPoliticalCommittee,
FLA. DEP'T OF STATE (Oct. 16, 2014), https://dos.elections.myflorida.com/campaigndocs/?account-64388 [https://penna.cc/2HPP-APFE] (select file with description "PAC Statement of
Organization").
54. From the start of the campaign in late 2014 until the end of 2015, the ACLU of Florida
reported $16,842.25 in in-kind contributions related to staff time for petition collection; the Brennan
Center reported $27,479; and Faith in Florida reported $54,265.70.
55. See infra Figure A.2 in the Appendix (showing the cumulative number of valid petitions for
Amendment 4 over time).
56. See id
57. Appendix I describes the collection of campaign finance records.
58. See Voting Restoration Amendment, supra note 9 (listing all relevant dates for the
amendment).
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Figure 1: Direct Contributions Before Ballot Qualification
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The Florida Supreme Court approved the language of the amendment on
April 20, 2017,59 which Figure 1 marks with a dotted vertical line. Before the
state supreme court approval, the campaign had raised just under $200,000. In
fact, from March 2015 to March 2016, the campaign collected no direct

contributions at all. The first significant contribution came in August 2016 when
the New Venture Fund, a nonprofit administered by Arabella Advisors, donated
$65,000. Other early supporters included Tides Advocacy, part of a social justice
nonprofit accelerator that also funded the Florida Rights Restoration Coalition,
and Faith in Action, the national organization of Faith in Florida.
The campaign's fundraising accelerated after the state supreme court

approved the ballot language, largely fueled by the support of the ACLU.
Beginning in the summer of 2017 and stretching through January 2018, the

campaign raised roughly $4 million. It used these new funds to pay a nationwide
petition management firm. With the firm's help, the campaign collected about
seven hundred thousand petitions over the final six months and qualified for the
ballot with just eight days to spare. 60

Figure 2 extends Figure 1, using one line to chart cumulative daily
contributions by donor to the campaign and another to chart cumulative
59. See Advisory Op. to the Att'y Gen. Re: Voting Restoration Amend., 215 So. 3d 1202 (Fla.
2017).
60.
Compare Voting Restoration Amendment, supra note 9 (reporting thatthe initiative qualified
for the ballot on January 23, 2018), with FLA. CONST. art. XI § 5(b) (providing a deadline of February 1
of the year in which the general election is held for initiatives to qualify for the ballot). Once the
collection effort began, it became a race against the clock, as a voter's signature is only good for two
years. See FLA. ADM[N. CODE r. 1S-2.0091(2)(a)(2).
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expenses, beginning in January 2018 when Amendment 4 qualified for the ballot.
The figure illustrates the pivotal role of three particular donors: the ACLU, which
continued to lend substantial support to the campaign; the Sixteen Thirty Fund, 61
a liberal secret-money nonprofit related to the New Venture Fund; and the
Bonderman family, long-time Democratic donors. 62
For most of 2018, after Amendment 4 qualified for the ballot, the campaign
had little money to spare. But Figure 2 shows that, in two summer days, the
campaign doubled what it had raised in the previous four years. Of the $6.6
million haul, $3.4 million came from the ACLU and $1.5 million came from the
Bonderman family. Contributions continued to well outpace expenses until near
Election Day, when the Sixteen Thirty Fund donated $3 million for the final
push.

Figure 2: Direct Contributions and Expenses After Ballot Qualification
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Ultimately, consistent with the historically partisan approach to the reenfranchisement of people with felony convictions, the largest donors to
Amendment 4 were distinctly liberal and Democratic. Table 1 shows all donors

61. See Scott Bland, LiberalSecret-Money NetworkHammersHouse GOP, POLITICO (July 29,
2018),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/29/democrats-dark-money-midterms-house-745145
[https://penna.cc/98UY-53YF].
62. See Liz Essley Wlhyte, How Billionairesfrom Other States Are Shaping This Year's Ballot
Measures, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov. 7, 2018), https://publicintegrity.org/politics/statepolitics/how-billionaires-from-other-states-are-shaping-this-years-ballot-measures/
[https://perma.cc/2MFW-3QQM].
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who directly contributed at least $200,000, or about 1 percent of the $24 million

the campaign eventually directly raised.63
Table 1: Top Direct Contributors
Contributor

ACLU
Sixteen Thirty Fund
Bonderman Family
Simons Family

State

Amount

Percent

NY
DC
CA-NY-TX
CA

$5,028,316
$3,950,000
$3,700,000
$1,000,000

20.9%
16.4%
15.4%
4.2%

League of Conservation Voters

DC

$800,000

3.3%

Open Philanthropy Action Fund
New Approach PAC
Beckenstein Family
Daniel Lewis

CA
NH
MA
FL

$750,000
$600,000
$500,000
$500,000

3.1%
2.5%
2.1%
2.1%

National Education Association

DC

$500,000

2.1%

Samantha Holloway

TX

$500,000

2.1%

Stacy Schusterman
State Engagement Fund

OK
DC

$500,000
$500,000

2.1%
2.1%

Nicholas Pritzker

CA

$450,000

1.9%

Mary Quinn Delaney

CA

$400,000

1.7%

Advocacy Fund

CA

$375,000

1.6%

Civic Action Fund
Simons Family

DC
NY

$300,000
$300,000

1.2%
1.2%

FL
FL
MA
CA-FL
DC

$250,000
$250,000
$250,000
$243,318
$200,000

1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
0.8%

Marsha Laufer
New Florida Vision PAC
Seth Klarman
Tides
New Approach PAC

B.

Petitioners

The almost one million registered voters who ultimately signed the petition
to put Amendment 4 on the ballot offer an early snapshot of registered voters'
support for Amendment 4. As might be expected, the early coalition was
distinctly Democratic and disproportionately Black. But, importantly, there were
signs of Republican support, particularly in lower income and more racially
diverse neighborhoods.
In order to determine which registered voters signed the petition, I made a
public information request to each of Florida's sixty-seven counties for all the
valid ballot petitions that the campaign collected and submitted. Although the
63. The top five in-kind contributors to the campaign were all entities associated with Tides
($668,083), Ben and Jerry's ($623,428), ACLU of Florida ($381,489), ACLU national ($285,738), and
Organize Florida ($245,705).
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data provided by each county varied, all counties provided the voter registration
number of each registered voter who signed the petition, and all but one provided
the date each petition was signed. I was able to learn the race and party affiliation
of nearly every petitioner by merging the petition data with an October 2018
copy of the statewide voter file. 64
Table 2 breaks down the party affiliation and race of each petitioner. The
first two rows provide a statewide benchmark: the number of registered voters at
the time of the November 2018 election and the corresponding percentage of
registered voters by party and by race. The remainder of the table reports three
quantities of interest about the petitions collected: (1) the number of petition
signers; (2) the take-up rate, or percentage of registered voters who signed the
petition; and (3) the relative composition of petition signers.
In general, about 6 percent of registered voters signed the petition, though

this take-up rate is inexact because the petition was circulated over the course of
multiple years, during which the total number of registered voters changed. Still,
although there were approximately equal numbers of registered Democrats and
registered Republicans in the state, Democrats were three times more likely than
Republicans to sign the petition. Similarly, while only about 13 percent of
registered voters were Black, Black registrants were also about three times more
likely than all other registrants to sign the petition.
Table 2: Petitioners by Party and Race
_
Quantity
Registered Voters (Nov. '18)
(Pet. of Reg. Voters)
Num. Overall Petitions Signed
(Take-up Rate)
(Relative Composition)

-

f
f
|

|

By Party
Dem
Rep
5,244,265 4,902,198
(37.2%)
(34.8%)
521,768
150,571
(9.9%)
(3.1%)

|

(77.6%)

Overall
14,081,632
881,261
(6.3%)

T
T

(22.4%)

-

f
f
[

By Race
Black
Not Black
1,892,464
12,189,168
(13.4%)
(86.6%)
292,154
586,268
(15.4%)
(4.8%)
(33.2%)

(66.5%)

Table 2 reflects both initial expressions of support for Amendment 4 and
the campaign's strategic decisions about which areas to target to collect petitions.
Nonetheless, in order to explain which types of registered Republicans signed
the petition, Table 3 calculates the petition take-up rate for registered voters
living in precincts at various deciles of estimated household income and percent
of Black registrants. 65 Foreshadowing the campaign's eventual success, the takeup rate by both registered Democrats and registered Republicans was
substantially higher in poorer precincts and more racially diverse ones. For
example, about 14 percent of Democrats and about 4 percent of Republicans
64. Appendix II offers more details on the data collection and data validation process. In
particular, Table A.1 shows that there were few issues with petition data quality; Table A.2 shows that
I was able to collect virtually every petition available; and Table A.3 shows that nearly every petitioner
was successfully matched to the voter file.
65.
I constructed the racial and class composition of each precinct using both the voter file and
the American Community Survey. The demographic data construction and validation process are
explained in Appendix II.E.
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signed the petition in the poorest precincts, relative to about 7 percent and about
2 percent in the richest ones. Similarly, about 17 percent of Democrats and about
6 percent of Republicans signed the petition in precincts with the highest
proportions of Black registrants, relative to about 5 percent and about 2 percent

in those with the lowest proportions.
Table 3: Petitioners by Precinct Household Income and Race

Decile
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

By Household Income
Income
% Sign Petition
Min
Max
Dem
Rep
$17,430
$45,120
14.1%
4.5%
$45,120
$51,800
11.0%
4.1%
$51,800
9.7%
3.6%
$57,260
$57,260
$62,510
9.7%
3.6%
$62,510
$67,660
9.7%
3.4%
$67,660
$74,510
8.8%
3.1%
$74,510
$83,700
8.6%
2.8%
$83,700
$95,000
8.2%
2.6%
$95,000
$115,370
7.8%
2.4%
$115,370 $685,240
7.1%
1.9%

C.

By Percent of Black Registrants
Black
% Sign Petition
Min
Max
Dem.
Rep
0.0%
0.9%
5.4%
1.8%
0.9%
1.8%
6.9%
2.5%
1.8%
3.1%
6.9%
2.6%
3.1%
4.7%
7.9%
3.3%
4.7%
6.5%
7.7%
3.0%
6.5%
9.1%
8.3%
3.4%
9.1%
12.4%
8.4%
3.3%
12.4%
18.5%
9.5%
3.6%
18.5%
36.8%
10.8%
4.0%
36.8% 100.0% 16.8%
6.3%

Message

The general election campaign was, in many ways, unlike the petition drive
for the simple reason that the electoral threshold was different. While the
campaign only needed to collect a minimum number of petitions to qualify for
the ballot, it needed at least 60 percent support from voters to amend the state
constitution. 66 As a result, if the petition drive was about turning out support, the
general election was about coalition building, particularly with Republicans and
conservatives.
1.

Defining the Narrative

The campaign polled various possible narratives to garner bipartisan

support. 67 Two narratives in particular stood out: a liberal frame, which cast
reform in terms of racial justice, and a conservative frame, which cast reform in
terms of redemption.
The racial justice framework was likely to be particularly compelling for
the major donors to Amendment 4. For example, although law professor
Michelle Alexander brought the analogy of mass incarceration to the New Jim

66. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(e) (constitutional amendments by initiative require 60 percent
support).
67. See, e.g., Supplemental Appendix to Reply Brief of Secretary of State, Laurel M. Lee, at
attach. C, Advisory Op. to GovemorRe: Implementation of Amend. 4, The Voting Restoration Amend.,
288 So. 3d 1070 (Fla. 2020) (No. SC19-1341) [hereinafter Supplemental Appendix to Lee Reply Brief]
(providing the results of the campaign's internal March 2017 telephone survey, which polled various
supporter messaging, including "[s]econd chances and forgiveness" and "disproportionate minorit[y]"
impact).
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Crow into the mainstream, 68 she built off of the ACLU's earlier efforts to
develop that narrative. 69 The Florida chapter of the ACLU not only founded7 0
and housed the Florida Rights Restoration Committee, which had served as the
hub for re-enfranchisement efforts in the state, but also helped draft the
amendment itself 71 The national ACLU was the campaign's largest supporter. 72
The New Jim Crow framework fits comfortably into reform efforts.
Academics and activists have compared felon disenfranchisement to the New
Jim Crow because felon disenfranchisement is, literally, a product of the old Jim
Crow. After the Civil War, the South embraced felon disenfranchisement as an
explicit tool to maintain white supremacy. 73 Felon disenfranchisement laws also
continue to have a starkly disparate racial impact. The Sentencing Project, the
primary research and advocacy organization for felon disenfranchisement
reform, estimates that about one in thirteen Black citizens across the country of
voting age could not vote in 2016 because of a criminal conviction. 74 To drive

this home, the cover of the Sentencing Project's prominent publication
cataloguing "Two Decades of Felony Disenfranchisement Reform" is a Black
man at a voting booth.75
The strength of the New Jim Crow framework is that it offers a systemic
critique of the historical practice of disenfranchisement. Many previous reform
efforts have thus invoked racial justice to support reform. 76 But to its credit, the
68.

MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF

COLORBLINDNESS 14 (2012) (arguing that "mass incarceration is, metaphorically, the New Jim Crow").
69. See James Forman, Jr., Racial CritiquesofMass Incarceration:Beyond the New Jim Crow,
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 25-27 (2012) (explaining "a brief history of the [phrase] 'New Jim Crow,"'
including its earlier use by Ira Glasser, former executive director of the ACLU, and Graham Boyd,
former leader of the ACLU's Drug Policy Litigation Unit).
70. See Emily Bazelon, WillFlorida'sEx-FelonsFinallyRegaintheRightto Vote?, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/magazine/ex-felons-voting-rightsflorida.html [https://perma.cc/SP3N-WNH2].
71. Howard Simon, the then-executive director of the Florida chapter of the ACLU, explained
in an interview, "I was on a committee of three people that worked for a year and a half on crafting th[e]
language." Daniel Rivero, Amendment 4 Passed Will ItActually Get Implemented?, WLRN (Nov. 8,
2018),
https://www.wlm.org/post/amendment-4-passed-will-it-actually-get-implemented
[https://perma.cc/PH63-JH4W].
72. See supraTable 1 (reporting the top direct contributors to the campaign).
73. See MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 30, at 41-68 (explaining the racial origins of modern
felon disenfranchisement). This racial history has been widely acknowledged, even by a judiciary
reticent to strike down felon disenfranchisement laws for their historical intent. See, e.g., Hunter v.
Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985) ("The Alabama Constitutional Convention of 1901 was part of a
movement that swept the post-Reconstruction South to disenfranchise blacks.").
74. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 3 (providing an overview of felon disenfranchisement).
75. See MCLEOD, supra note 4.
76. Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe, for example, explained his 2016 executive order to
effectively end the state's practice of lifetime disenfranchisement by noting that "we've had a horrible
history in voting rights as relates to African Americans" and arguing that "we should remedy it . . as
soon as we possibly can." Stolberg & Eckholm, supra note 44. Further, Iowa Governor Tom Vilsack's
executive order explained that "disenfranchisement of offenders has a disproportionate racial
impact .... " Iowa Exec. Order No. 42, 28 Iowa Admin. Bull. 218 (Aug. 3, 2005). New York Governor
Andrew Cuomo used nearly identical language. See N.Y. Exec. Order No. 181, 40 N.Y. Reg. 122 (May
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campaign recognized that framing reform in terms of the New Jim Crow was, at
best, a difficult political strategy to win a supermajority of a battleground state
like Florida.77
As Meade, the campaign's chair, explained, "most of [the] narrative" about
felon disenfranchisement reform "has been about the disproportionate impact it
has on the African American community, [which has in turn] created a narrative
that would make people naturally assume that . . it's only African Americans
that are impacted by this particular policy .

. .

."78 Meade recognized that the

racialization of disenfranchisement led to a series of "quick, barely conscious
processes" in which people would say "African American people are in prison.
African Americans are disenfranchised. African Americans generally vote for
Democrats.

. .

. [The] ballot initiative [i]s for Democrats." 79

But "in reality," Meade explained, "the average person in Florida [who has]
lost their voting rights does not look like me. They're not African American." 8 0
In fact, only about one-third of people nationally who have been convicted of a
felony and completed any period of prison or supervision are African
American. 81 In Florida, it is closer to one-quarter. 82
The campaign's internal polling revealed that only about one-quarter of
likely voters found a racial justice framework "very convincing;" 83 similar
results led the campaign to conclude that "[f]ocusing on the racial element of
disenfranchisement is not an effective way to grow support, particularly among

16, 2018) ("Disenfranchisement of individuals on parole has a significant disproportionate racial impact
thereby reducing the representation of minority populations."). Notably, executive orders that have
invoked racial justice to frame reform require no legislative or public support.
77. See MEADE, supra note 48, at 113 ("That racialization of our ballot initiative was the next
hurdle we had to face, and it was a large one. In a state like Florida, we would need more than just
African Americans to support the issue.").
78. At Liberty, DesmondMeade and Dale Ho on Restoring the Right to Vote (ep. 5) (July 19,
2018), ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/print/node/69130 [https://penna.cc/5MVH-74P8]; see also
MEADE, supra note 48, at 121-22 ("Because a lot of the attention was put on the disproportionate impact
mass incarceration has had on African American and Latinx populations, it was natural to start thinking
of felon disenfranchisement as a Black or Brown issue.").
79. MEADE, supranote 48, at 125.
80. At Liberty, supra note 78; see also MEADE, supra note 48, at 114 ("The math, however,
doesn't support this conclusion."). For the more general, and academic, version of this argument, see
MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 138

(2015) (arguing that the frame of The New Jim Crow "has helped perpetuate the mistaken view that the
problem of the carceral state is a problem confined primarily to African Americans and members of
other minority groups").
81. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 15 tbl.3, 16 tbl.4 (estimating a total of 3,092,471
disenfranchised persons "post-sentence," of which 1,061,377 are African American).
82. See id (estimating a total of 1,487,847 disenfranchised persons in Florida "post-sentence,"
of which 418,224 are African American); see also MEADE, supra note 48, at 114 (same).
83.
Supplemental Appendix to Lee Reply Brief, supra note 67, attach C, at 73-74 (reporting
the results of the campaign's internal March 2017 telephone survey, which asked how convincing
various statements were as a reason to support the amendment, including that "[t]his amendment returns
fairness to the historically-biased Florida criminal justice system").
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Republican and Independent voters ... ."84 Further, the vast majority of people
surveyed also thought that the beneficiaries of Amendment 4 would register as
Democrats, fueling the counternarrative that reform was nothing but a political
organizing effort for the left. 85

Instead of focusing on racial justice, the campaign charted a new course.
As Meade explained during the height of the campaign: "I ask folks .

.

. would

you like to never be forgiven for anything you've done in your life? I think at the
end of the day, this thing is about forgiveness, it's about redemption and
restoration .... "86 The same internal polling showed that respondents were
twice as likely to rate this alternative frame as "very convincing." 87
Rather than echo Michelle Alexander and the New Jim Crow framework,
the campaign's message instead evoked the work of the Prison Fellowship, a
Christian nonprofit that "emphasiz[es] . . . the humanity of the imprisoned and
the possibility of redemption .... "88 The campaign thus described Amendment

4 as a "human issue," "not a partisan issue." 89 Their moral language won the
campaign the endorsement of the Christian Coalition of America, which
expressly referenced forgiveness in its endorsing op-ed. 90 Together, Meade, a

Black Democrat, and the campaign's political director, Neil Volz, a white
Republican, often stressed that they were "fighting just as hard, if not more, for
that guy that wanted to vote for Donald Trump than a guy who wishes to vote
for Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama."

9

1

To emphasize what might otherwise be unexpected given the dominant
framing of felon disenfranchisement reform around racial justice, the organizers
set out to "educat[e] people about the impact a felony conviction can have on a

84. Supplemental Appendix to Lee Reply Brief, supra note 67, attach. B, at 47 (summarizing
"key learnings that may impact the success of the Campaign's messaging efforts from previous
research").
85. See Supplemental Appendix to Lee Reply Brief, supra note 67, attach. C, at 86 (reporting
the results of the campaign's internal March 2017 telephone survey, which included the question, "Do
you think that those who have their voting rights restored are more likely to register as .... ").
86. At Liberty, supra note 78; see also MEADE, supranote 48, at 101 ("I was fortunate enough
to attend four out of the five focus groups, and one of the things I felt strongly was that people there did
believe in redemption. They did believe in restoration as a matter of moral principle."); id. at 141 ("What
I was talking about was based on values that are shared by everyone, especially when you talk about
forgiveness and redemption and restoration.").
87.
Supplemental Appendix to Lee Reply Brief, supra note 67, attach C, at 73 (summarizing
the results of the campaign's internal March 2017 telephone survey).
88.
DAvID DAGAN & STEVEN M. TELES, PRISON BREAK: WHY CONSERVATIVES TURNED
AGAINST MASS INCARCERATION 143 (2016).

89. MEADE, supranote 48, at 114-15.
90. See Keith den Hollander, Opinion, We SupportRestoration ofan Ex-Felon's Voting Rights,
NEWS-PRESS
(Sept.
13,
2018),
https://www.newspress.com/story/opinion/contributors/2018/09/13/we-support-restoration-ex-felons-votingrights/1289891002/ [https://perma.cc/U5SF-QZWV] ("As Christians . . divinity is what we strive for,
and forgiving those who have trespassed against society, and restoring them to a right relationship is just
a little more divine, and why we are supporting Amendment 4.").
91. Bazelon, supra note 70.
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."92 The

campaign "was very intentional in going to places that were predominately white

or predominately conservative to talk about felon disenfranchisement .... "93
Advertisements for Amendment 4 largely focused on older whites. For example,
the first ad, produced by a partner organization, featured a white father returning
home from prison to his wife and teenage daughter. 94 In another ad, aptly titled
"Redemption," the campaign highlighted a series of people who had lost their
right to vote for life.95 Figure 3 presents four sequential scenes from the ad.
Figure 3: Four Scenes from "Redemption"

The campaign spotlighted Brett Ramsden, the white father shown in the
bottom left of Figure 3, more than anyone else. Along with a solo spot in
September and "Redemption" in October, the campaign released a third ad
featuring him and his family. 96 The ad introduced Brett as someone who "was
addicted to opioids and has a non-violent felony conviction. Now he's clean, has
completed the terms of his sentence, and is helping others." 97
The campaign also focused on redemption's purported tangible benefits,

particularly in its outreach to business conservatives. As one ad put it, a vote for
Amendment 4 was a vote to "[r]educe crime, create safer communities, and
foster a healthier economy." 98 In this sense, the campaign also evoked the
92. Id
93. MEADE, supranote 48, at 122.
94. See Alliance for Safety and Justice, #TimeDone: When Will Our Sentence End?, YOUTUBE
(Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xf2TEMubNp8 [https://penna.cc/225H-QQAD].
95. See
Second Chances Florida, Redemption, YOUTUBE (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TQwWfQZBVDY [https://penna.cc/G9MB-GJTM].
96. See Second Chances Florida, Brett and Mallery, YOUTUBE (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-maKY4vocHLU [https://penna.cc/3SNQ-MZ8M].
97. Id
98. Second Chances Florida, Turn the Page, YOUTUBE (Sept. 7, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-nDQ8X_59Ixo [https://penna.cc/8JCC-FZS7].
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messaging of Right on Crime, another conservative group that champions a

"return on investment" approach focused on the cost savings of reducing prison
and jail populations. 99 Although felon disenfranchisement does not fit neatly into
this framework, the campaign cast the restoration of voting rights as a re-entry
program in and of itself. 00
2.

Defining the Terms of Sentence

The campaign's redemption narrative did not stir the type of organized

Republican opposition found across the country in response to other efforts to
restore voting rights to people with felony convictions.' 0' In fact, the campaign's
inclusive, moral, and business language won the endorsement of the influential
Koch brothers, two of the leading Republican donors in the nation and central
supporters of the conservative group Right on Crime. 0 2 Ron DeSantis, the

Republican candidate for governor, "ha[d] been ducking questions from the press
about the ballot initiative for months."1 03 Eventually, in a debate, he came out as
opposed to Amendment 4.104 But the Republican Party of Florida took no

99. See DAGAN & TELES, supranote 88, at 73.
100. An economic impact analysis touted by the campaign claimed reform would significantly
reduce both crime and unemployment. See THE WASHINGTON ECON. GRP., ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
RESTORING THE ELIGIBILITY TO VOTE FOR FLORIDIANS WITH FELONY CONVICTIONS AS A RESULT OF

PASSAGE
OF
AMENDMENT
4
(2018),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1sP2BiKCEmkgJOiKjAgUBAwl75H5UP08/view [https://perma.cc/P3LB-2WJA]. Key supporters repeated this
fact and the campaign amplified it. See, e.g., Press Release, Second Chances Florida, Economic Study
Says Amendment 4 to Add $365 Million to Florida's Economy Annually (May 17, 2018),
https://web.archive.org/web/20180926152350/https://secondchancesfl.org/media/presssee
releases/economic-study-says-amendment-4-to-add-365-million-to-floridas-economy-annually/;
also MEADE, supra note 48, at xii-xiii (recounting these claims by the campaign). The conservative
firm's analysis, though, was less than logical, the result of flagrantly misinterpreting a state report on
recidivism and confusing the restoration of the right to vote withthe expungement of a felony conviction,
which is the actual barrier to employment. But the shoddy analysis was never seriously contested.
101. See MEADE, supranote 48, at 144 (describing the concern throughout the campaign "if some
misleading attack ads were going to drop at any minute, from a previously unknown group, and if they
did, what kind of impact that would have").
102. See Press Release, Second Chances Florida, Freedom Partners Chamber of Commerce
Endorses Amendment 4 (Sept. 13, 2018), https://capitalsoup.com/2018/09/13/freedom-partnerschamber-of-commerce-endorses-amendment-4/ [https://perma.cc/PJH8-T5ZL].
103. Bazelon, supra note 70.
104. See Steve Bosquet, Diverse DonorsFundFinalPush in Campaignto Win Voting Rightsfor
Florida Felons, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics[https://perma.cc/MEY5-TYEA] (quoting Ron
government/state-politics/aricle220614240.html
DeSantis as saying that "I think it's wrong to automatically restore rights to felons who've committed
very serious crimes .... I want people to be redeemed. But you've got to prove thatyou're getting back
with the law.").
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position on Amendment 4.105 In fact, no political committee registered to oppose
Amendment 4.106

This lack of organized opposition was largely because the campaign took a
cautious and conservative approach, evoking, if not following, the playbook set
by former Governor Crist to explain the restoration of voting rights years before.
"If you're a fair-minded person and you truly believe in the concept that an
individual pays their debt to society," Crist said in 2006, "then if they've paid
their debt to society, they've paid it."1 07 To win his cabinet's support, and
perhaps to align with the redemption narrative, Crist excluded individuals
convicted of murder, sexual offenses, and other violent offenses from his
executive reform. lo He also explicitly required the payment of restitution. 09
The campaign for Amendment 4 used nearly the same slogan as Crist,
arguing that Florida should expand voting rights because "when a debt is paid
it's paid,"" 0 and made the same strategic exclusions about who would not be
restored the right to vote. The campaign specifically excluded individuals
convicted of "murderor a felony sexual offense," regardless of whether they had

105.
See Steve Bousquet A Long, Hot Summer of Building Support to GrantFelonsthe Right to
Vote,
TAMPA
BAY
TIMES
(July
19,
2018),
https://www.tampabay.com/floridapolitics/buzz/2018/07/19/a-long-hot-summer-of-building-support-to-grant-felons-the-right-to-vote/
[https://perma.cc/YDX9-DZ5E] ("The Republican Party of Florida has endorsed eight of the 13 ballot
questions, but took no position on Amendment 4.").
106. Richard Harrison incorporated the group Floridians for a Sensible Voting Rights Policy in
2017 and wrote op-eds opposing Amendment 4. See, e.g., Richard Harrison, Column: Reject Effort to
Restore Voting Rights for Most Felons, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Aug. 31, 2017),
http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/column-reject-effort-to-restore-voting-rights-for-mostfelons/2335809 [https://perma.cc/N7K2-53ZQ]. But he never formed a political committee to legally
accept contributions or make expenditures to advocate against Amendment 4.
107. William March, Crist Would Let All Felons Vote, TAMPA BAY TRIB. (Oct. 14, 2006)
(describing Crist's approach). Crist, however, did not invent the analogy. For example, former President
Clinton used it to support expanding the restoration of voting rights, see William Jefferson Clinton,
Opinion,
Erasing
America's
Color Lines,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
14,
2001),
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/14/opinion/erasing-america-s-color-lines.html
[https://perma.cc/DL7Z-2DKA] ("[Ilt is long past time to give back the rightto vote to ex-offenders who
have paid their debts to society."), and Justice Marshall used it at the Supreme Court, see Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) ("The Court today holds that a State may strip ex-felons who have
fully paid their debt to society of their fundamental right to vote .... ").
108.
See FLA. COMM'N ON OFFENDERREv., OFF. OF EXEC. CLEMENCY, RULES FOR EXECUTIVE
CLEMENCY
(2007)
[hereinafter
2007
RULES
FOR
EXEC.
CLEMENCY],
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/morse/files/crist_2007_policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3X89-DZQN]
(listing each disqualifying offense in section 9(A)(4)); see also Farhad Manjoo, What Was Charlie Crist
Thinking?,
SALON
(Apr.
6,
2007),
https://www.salon.com/2007/04/06/crist_10/
[https://perma.cc/4GPF-HLXF] (describing the negotiation between Crist and his cabinet members,
including this concession).
109. See 2007 RULES FOR EXEC. CLEMENCY, supra note 108, at 7 § 9(A)(3) ("The person has
paid all restitution pursuant to a court order or civil judgment....").
110. For uses of the slogan in press releases, see, for example, Press Release, Second Chances
Florida, Freedom PartnersChamber of Commerce Endorses Amendment 4, supra note 102. For uses in
other advertisements, see, for example, Second Chances Florida, Gary Winston, YOUTUBE (Oct. 15,
2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9YnEUm4OG0
[https://perma.cc/W3VT-E6YJ] and
Second Chances Florida, Redemption, supra note 95.
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completed the terms of their sentence.I After a series of focus groups, the
campaign concluded that "[e]xcluding murderers and sex offenders is central to
developing potentially passable ballot language" as it "preempt[s] the
opposition[']s strongest message against the amendment.""

2

The campaign

repeatedly reminded the public of this tradeoff in its press releases and
advertisements."1

3

all terms of
While Amendment 4's requirement to "complet[e] . .
sentence," did not specifically mention restitution, the campaign made clear that
those who owed restitution would not be able to vote because restitution
implicated personal responsibility. As the campaign explained, people with
felony convictions had to earn back their right to vote by ensuring victims are
"made whole."" 4 Consistent with this, the campaign's website explained how
"Amendment 4 restores the eligibility to vote to people with past felony
convictions who fully complete their entire sentence-including any probation,

parole, and restitution-before earning back the eligibility to vote."
As with restitution, the text of Amendment 4 also did not mention the
court-ordered assessment of fines or fees. Early on, a statewide finance
committee, formed after the campaign collected 10 percent of the necessary
petitions, flagged the campaign's proposed language as ambiguous. "It is

unclear," they wrote in late 2016, "whether the phrase 'terms of sentence'
includes payment of court-ordered restitution, fines and court costs.""1 6 When
Jon L. Mills, the campaign's lawyer and a drafter of the amendment, went before
the Florida Supreme Court several months later to seek approval of the ballot
111. See Voting RestorationAmendment, supra note 9 (codified at FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b)).
112.
Supplemental Appendix to Lee Reply Brief, supra note 67, attach F, at 122 (reporting the
results of the campaign's internal August 2014 online survey); see also MEADE, supra note 48, at 101
("We did focus groups throughout the state of Florida .... We found out a few things of distinct interest.
The first was that people were strongly opposed to restoring voting rights to people who were convicted
of crimes like murder, child molestation, and rape."); MANZA & UGGEN, supranote 30, at 216 & fig.9.3
(explaining that "the main avenue through which defenders of felon disenfranchisement might influence
public opinion would be to target the most stigmatized categories of criminal offenders").
113. Eg., Second Chances Florida, Gary Winston, supra note 110.
114. Lawrence Mower, Amendment 4 Will Likely Cost 'Mllions' to Carry Out. Here's Why.,
TAMPABAY TIMEs (Apr. 4, 2019), http://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/2019/04/04/amendment4-will-likely-cost-millions-to-carry-out-heres-why [https://perma.cc/ZH7T-6L62].
115. Advisory Op. to Governor Re: Implementation of Amend. 4, The Voting Restoration
Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070, 1077 (Fla. 2020) (referencing the campaign's website). Similarly, campaign
press releases routinely emphasized how "Amendment 4 would restore the eligibility to vote to
Floridians who have served their time and completed all terms of their sentence as ordered by a judge
including parole, probation, and restitution." Eg., Press Release, Second Chances Florida, National
Military Veterans Organization VoteVets Announces Support for Amendment 4 (Sept. 27, 2018),
https://capitalsoup.com/2018/09/27/national-military-veterans-organization-votevets-announcessupport-for-amendment-4/ [https://perma.cc/5YE8-PE5E].
116.
FIN. IMPACT ESTIMATING CONF.,FLA. OFF. OF ECON. & DEMOGRAPHIC RSCH., COMPLETE
INITIATIVE FINANCIAL INFORMATION STATEMENT VOTING RESTORATION AMENDMENT (14-01) 2

(2016),
http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/constitutional-amendments/2018Ballot/VRAReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5YKS-R4ZY]. At the time, the ambiguity redounded to the benefit of the campaign,
because it meant that "[t]he revenue impact, if any" of the amendment "c [ould] not be determined." Id.
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language, he specifically addressed these questions. When asked during oral
argument whether the amendment "would ... include the full payment of any
fines," Mills responded, "Yes, sir. . . . [A]ll terms means all terms within the four
corners."1 7 When asked whether it "would . . . also include restitution," Mills

responded, "Yes.""1 8 One justice took the requirement to pay fines to mean a
requirement to pay fees, or costs, too.11 9 When another justice later described
how "fines, costs, and restitution are a requirement" of the amendment and asked
whether the Secretary of State could "require .

.

. the registrant . .. to ...

themselves certify [that they've] done this," Mills embraced the premise. 2 0
"There's no reason that the Secretary of State couldn't do that," he said.12 ' "The
scope of this clearly says that's what's required." 22
Another indicia of the campaign's own understanding of "completion of all
terms of sentence" came in a February 2018 memorandum written by Howard

Simon, the campaign's vice chair and a drafter of Amendment 4, and Marc
Mauer, the then executive director of the Sentencing Project.1 23 Simon and
Mauer were focused on correcting "[t]he number of people who could be directly
impacted by Amendment 4."124 Although the memo acknowledged that there are
"no good estimates" for the extent of fines and fees, the memo explained that
under Amendment 4, "Floridians who have completed supervision of a felony

117. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Advisory Op. to Att'y Gen. Re: Voting Restoration
Amend.,
215
So.
3d
1202
(Fla.
2017)
(Nos.
16-1785,
16-1981)
https://wfsu.org/gavel2gavel/transcript/pdfs/16-1785_16-1981.pdf [https://penna.cc/6P77-R4UL]; see
also Advisory Op. to Governor Re: Implementation of Amend. 4, The Voting Restoration Amend., 288
So. 3d 1070, 1072-73 (Fla. 2020) (recounting this exchange in addressing the meaning of the phrase
"all terms of sentence").
118. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 117, at 10.
119. See id (Justice Lawson prefacing his question by noting that "you said that terms of sentence
include fines and costs").
120. Id at 11.
121. Id
122. Id In his subsequent history of the campaign, Meade sought to distance the campaign from
Mills's representations, characterizing the questions as coming "out of nowhere" and the answers as
made "in a different context" and "on the fly." MEADE, supranote 48, at 151. But Mills's response was
consistent with the campaign's brief seeking approval for Amendment 4 to be placed on the ballot, which
explained that "the drafters intend that individuals with felony convictions . . will automatically regain
their right to vote upon fulfillment ofall obligations imposed under their criminal sentence." Advisory
Op. to Governor Re: Implementation of Amend. 4, The Voting Restoration Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070,
1077 (Fla. 2020) (recounting the campaign's earlier brief to the court). Further, there was no immediate
effort to correct the representation. In fact, after the hearing, Howard Simon issued a press release
thanking the court and "express[ing] our gratitude to Jon Mills . . for his work so far in the effort to
restore voting rights." Press Release, ACLU of Fla., ACLU Statement on Florida Supreme Court
Hearing on Voting Rights Restoration Ballot Language (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.aclufl.org/en/pressreleases/aclu-statement-florida-supreme-court-hearing-voting-rights-restoration-ballot
[https://perma.cc/R4JF-HJAF].
123. See Memorandum from Howard Simon, Exec. Dir., ACLU Fla., and Marc Mauer, Exec.
Dir., Sent'g Project, to Exec. Bd., Second Chances Team (Feb. 11, 2018) [hereinafter Simon-Mauer
Memorandum],
https://docs.google.com/document/d/lom2OyURi8GKBdtYUuur-RRyAagoYlSvmWDWRYghVss/edit [https://perma.cc/RZV8-D5Y5].
124. Id at 2.

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

1166

[Vol. 109:1141

sentence . . . could be eligible for the restoration of their ability to vote [only]
upon payment of fines, fees, and restitution." 125
One reason

the

campaign proposed

restoring voting

rights

upon

"completion of all terms of sentence" is that polling showed "[a]n exclusion for
fines and fees will lower support" for reform. 126 For example, during a research
briefing in September 2014, about a month before the ballot language was
finalized, the campaign reviewed various options for when to propose restoring
the right to vote.' 2 7 The participants, including Desmond Meade, the campaign's

chair, and Myrna Perez, the director of voting rights and elections for the
Brennan Center, discussed the pros and cons of restoring voting rights after the
"full sentence" as opposed to "post time served."1 28 The pros for the "full
sentence" option included the fact that it "[p]olls higher" and that, relatedly, there
are "[l]ess opposition arguments."1 29 The cons were that there would be a
"[d]isparate impact on the poor [who would be] unable to pay fines and
restitution." 130 As a result, the campaign understood this option would "restore[]
voting rights to less people."131 Conversely, the pros of the "post time served"
option were that it would "[r]estore[] voting rights to more impacted people" and
that "[m]ore people [would] get their voting rights faster."1 32 But the cons were
clear: it would be a "[h]arder fight to win 60% + 1% approval," particularly
because the "opposition c[ould] use [the] 'didn't pay back full debt' argument.133
Still, the campaign never squarely addressed to the public, as opposed to
the court, whether the proposed amendment would require the payment of
outstanding fines and fees, at least with the same clarity used to address murder,
sexual offenses, and restitution. The campaign's slogan, "when a debt is paid,
it's paid," is a metaphor about redemption, but also, literally, about money. As a
125. Id
126.
Supplemental Appendix to Lee Reply Brief, supra note 67, attach B, at 42 (summarizing
the results of an August 2014 online survey); see MEADE, supra note 48, at 101-02 (explaining how,
based on a series of focus groups to understand support for reform, the campaign "carved out those
convicted of homicide, sexual crimes, or crimes against children, and . . introduced the stipulation that
a returning citizen must have completed all of their post-release obligations. When we did that, the
support for restoration skyrocketed.").
127. See Supplemental Appendix to Lee Reply Brief, supra note 67, attach. D, at 90, 103
(showing the "[p]ros and [c]ons of [p]olicy [c]hoices" as part of the "FloridaRights Restoration Briefing
(Sept. 2, 2014)").
128. Id at 103.
129. Id
130. Id
131. Id
132. Id
133. Id When the campaign announced the support of the Koch brothers, their representative,
Senior Vice President of Koch Industries Mark Holden, explained that "[w]e believe that when
individuals have served their sentences and paid their debts as ordered by a judge, they should be
eligible to vote." Press Release, Second Chances Florida, Freedom Partners Chamber of Commerce
Endorses Amendment 4, supra note 102 (emphasis added). Although the campaign's slogan that "when
a debt is paid, it's paid," could sometimes be interpreted symbolically as a reference to time served, the
Koch brothers appeared to be literally describing the importance of paying fines, fees, and restitution to
their support.
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result, some have argued that newspaper coverage at the time was distinctly
ambiguous about the actual scope of Amendment 4.134
D.

Victory

The organizers of Amendment 4 ran a new type of campaign in perhaps the

toughest state for felon disenfranchisement reform in the country and won a
watershed victory.1 35 To understand the breadth of the electoral coalition
supporting Amendment 4, I made another round of public information requests

to the supervisor of elections in each of Florida's counties to gather the ballots
cast in the 2018 election.

Ballot-level data is about as difficult to obtain as it is useful to analyze.
Most states, including Florida, make aggregate election results readily available
online. These summaries report how many votes each candidate or amendment
received-either by precinct, county, or statewide. This format makes sense
given the job of election administrators to certify the results of each contest. In
recent years, though, it has become possible for election administrators to
electronically preserve the raw, ballot-level data when tallying each ballot cast.
By definition, aggregating the raw data can verify the reported number of votes

in each contest. But the primary benefit of obtaining ballot-level data is that it
reveals how individuals vote across contests.
The ballot data, however, are not posted online. Many counties had
difficulty fulfilling my request because they had never received a similar oneno one had ever comprehensively compiled ballot-level data in Florida, for 2018
or any other year. Ultimately, my baseline dataset includes ballots from fifty-two
of Florida's sixty-seven counties.136
Figure 4 uses ballot-level data to illustrate support for Amendment 4 by
party, using individuals' votes for governor in the top panel or senator in the
bottom panel as a proxy for partisanship.1 37 Each panel shows the relative
percentage of people who voted yes on Amendment 4 given their vote for
134. See Kousser Report, supra note 32, app., at 30-33 tbl.2, 35 tbl.3, 36-37 tbl.4, 39-42 tbl.5,
42 tbl.6 (collecting newspaper articles that refer to Amendment 4's requirement to complete "terms of
a sentence" in different ways).
135. See November 6, 2018 GeneralElection Official Results Voting RestorationAmendment,
FLA.

DEP'T

OF

STATE,

DIV.

OF

ELECTIONS,

https://results.elections.myflorida.com/DetailRpt.Asp?ELECTIONDATE=11/6/2018&RACE=A04&
PARTY=&DIST=&GRP=&DATAMODE= [https://perma.cc/3Y44-LN8Y].
136. Appendix III details my collection effort for each county. Table A.4 reports that I collected
about 6.1 million total votes for Amendment 4. However, in some counties, each page of the ballot is
separated and cannot be linked together. Thus, my baseline dataset focuses on the 5.4 million
Amendment 4 votes which can be linked to a vote for statewide office. Given that about 8 million votes
were cast for Amendment 4 statewide, my baseline ballot dataset includes roughly 67 percent of the
votes cast in the state. Table A.5 validates the ballot data by showing that the total votes recorded for
governor in the ballot data is very similar to the total votes reported for governor according to the
statewide results, with the exception of a few counties which did not provide mail ballots.
137. Figure A.3 and Figure A.4 show how this marks an improvement over the standard approach
of ecological inference, which relies on aggregate precinct-level rather than individual ballot-level data.
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governor or senator. By design, the percentages within a panel sum to 100
percent.
As expected,1 38 Democrats were strongly supportive of Amendment 4.

Among those who voted Democratic for governor, the top-left panel shows that
86 percent supported Amendment 4. But critically, Republicans were supportive

of reform too. Among those who voted Republican for governor, the top-right
panel shows that 40 percent voted for Amendment 4.139 The pattern in the bottom
panels using the Senate race is essentially the same.
Figure 4: Vote for Amendment 4 by Vote for Statewide Offices
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138. The polling before the election consistently showed bipartisan support for Amendment 4,
but the extent of Republican support varied over time and by pollster. In March 2017, for example, an
internal poll found 82 percent support among Democrats and 58 percent support among Republicans.
See Supplemental Appendix to Lee Reply Brief, supra note 67, attach C, at 67, 78. A September 2018
poll commissioned by the campaign showed 88 percent support among Democrats and 59 percent
support among Republicans. See Press Release, Second Chances Florida, Latest Statewide Poll Finds
74% of Floridians Support Amendment 4 (Oct. 1, 2018), https://capitalsoup.com/2018/10/01/lateststatewide-poll-finds-74-of-floridians-support-amendment-4/ [https://perma.cc/S524-V8XU]. But an
October poll by a different firm commissioned by a media group instead put Republican support at 40
percent. See STPETEPOLLS.ORG, FLORIDA STATEWIDE GENERAL-ELECTION SURVEY CONDUCTED
FOR
FLORIDAPOLITICS.COM
(2018),

http://stpetepolls.org/files/StPetePolls_2018_State_GEN_Amend46_October28_PD5S.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H3FV-9SDG].
139. One concern is that some votes for Amendment 4 may reflect ballot fatigue rather than true
preferences, particularly in light of the fact that Amendment 4 was one of twelve statewide amendments
in addition to potentially numerous local amendments. But Table A.6 shows that the estimate of partisan
support for Amendment 4 is similar when limiting the analysis to ballots with at least one yes vote and
at least one no vote on any of the statewide amendments.
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In order to explain the campaign's broad support, particularly among

Republicans,"' I supplemented the ballot data with the racial and class
composition of each precinct. Figure 5, below, shows the distribution of partisan
support for Amendment 4 at the precinct level, using the forty-four counties for
which ballot data with precinct information is available. The height of each bar
shows the number of precincts with various levels of partisan support among
voters categorized as either Democrats or Republicans, as determined by their
vote for governor. In the median precinct, about 41 percent of Republicans and
85 percent of Democrats voted for Amendment 4.
Figure 5: Precinct-Level Partisan Support for Amendment 4

This variation in support for Amendment 4 provides some leverage to

explore which types of voters were most likely to support felon
disenfranchisement reform.
Figure 6, below, shows that the campaign was particularly successful at
persuading Republicans in poorer neighborhoods to buck their partisanship and

support reform. More specifically, the figure plots the relationship between
support for Amendment 4 and the estimated household income of precincts. The
left panel examines ballots that voted Democratic for governor, while the right
panel examines ballots that voted Republican. Each point in each panel
represents a precinct. The size of the point represents the number of ballots cast
and the darkness of the point indicates the number of similar precincts overlaid
on one another.

140.

ballots cast.

Importantly, all analyses that follow in this Section are limited to precincts with at least 100
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In general, Democratic support was high and steady across all estimated

household income levels. By contrast, there was a strong class difference in the
preference of Republican voters. While the relationship between income and
Republican support is roughly linear for the bulk of precincts, the overall
relationship appears non-linear because Republicans in the poorest precincts

were particularly supportive of Amendment 4 while Republicans in the richest
precincts were about as supportive as Republicans in the median precinct. One
reason that the campaign may have persuaded Republican voters to support

reform is that the expanding carceral net has also caught many white, often poor
people too.
Figure 6: Partisan Support for Amendment 4 by Precinct Class Context

Among

Demnocrats

Among

Reubcn

Figure 7 shows that the campaign's focus on redemption, rather than racial
justice, did not come at the cost of reducing Democratic support. The figure is

styled the same way as Figure 6 but focuses on the percentage of African
Americans among all registered voters in the precinct, constructed using the
statewide voter file. Both Democratic and Republican voters were more likely to
support reform in more racially diverse precincts. This pattern is particularly
interesting because the typical perception that expanding voting rights to people

with felony convictions would harm Republicans was more likely to be a
relevant consideration in areas with more racial diversity.
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Figure 7: Partisan Support for Amendment 4 by Precinct Racial Context

Among Republicans

Amonq Democrats

F .

A

II.
THE PARTISAN IMPLEMENTATION: ESTIMATING THE PARTISAN CONSEQUENCES
OF REFORM

Despite the watershed electoral victory, partisan politics quickly engulfed
the implementation of Amendment 4. Although the campaign took the position
that the amendment was self-implementing,141 the actual scope of reform
depended on the interpretation of the requirement that a person first "complet[e]
all terms of [their] sentence" before regaining their right to vote.1 42 The media
coverage of the campaign's victory and the closeness of other statewide elections
only amplified the entrenched expectation that the restoration of voting rights
would benefit the Democrats.1 43 Consistent with this expectation, every
Republican in the legislature ultimately voted to limit the scope of Amendment
4 by defining the term "completion of all terms of sentence" to include the
141. See, e.g., Rivero, supra note 71 (quoting Howard Simon, then the executive director of the
Florida ACLU and a drafter of Amendment 4 that, "the language that we wrote . . is as clear as it could
be, and it's self-executing").

142.

FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(a).

143. For example, Rick Scott, the Republican candidate for Senate who had so restricted the
restoration of voting rights as governor that he prompted the campaign for Amendment 4, won his race
by only one-tenth of one percent. See November 6, 2018 GeneralElection OfficialResults UnitedStates
Senator,

FLA.

DEP'T

OF

STATE,

DIV.

OF

ELECTIONS,

https://results.elections.myflorida.com/DetailRpt.Asp?ELECTIONDATE=11/6/2018&RACE=USS&
PARTY=&DIST=&GRP=&DATAMODE= [https://perma.cc/2GBN-UTZB].
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payment of fines, fees, and restitution.1 44 Every Democratic colleague opposed

the legislation.1 45
While the stark legislative divide was a sharp break from the campaign, it
fit neatly into the many examples of Republican politicians' opposition to
reform. And to the extent the campaign's bipartisan coalition was built, in part,
on the ambiguity of what was included in a sentence, it appears to have collapsed
when that ambiguity was resolved.1 46 Once the legislature became polarized, the
public did as well: about 70 percent of Democrats opposed the implementing
legislation, and about 70 percent of Republicans supported it. 147

Part II gathers new data on the political behavior of people with felony
convictions to show that this sharp partisan divide is at odds with the empirical
evidence. Ultimately, the estimated political preferences and turnout of people
who initially benefited from Amendment 4 or previously benefitted from
executive clemency reform validates the campaign's strategy to reframe the
restoration of voting rights as a question about citizenship.
A.

How to Measure the PoliticalBehavior of People with Felony
Convictions

The roughly six-month period between when Amendment 4 went into

effect and when the Republican implementing legislation went into effect offers
a limited opportunity to assess the actual, rather than perceived, political
behavior of the people who stood to benefit from a more robust interpretation of
Amendment 4.148 The roughly one hundred fifty thousand people who regained

144. See Jonesv. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1236 (N.D. Fla. 2020) (describingthe "straight
party-line vote"), rev 'd andvacatedsub. nom. Jones v. Govemor of Fla. 975 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 2020)
(en banc). The legislation defined "completion of all terms of sentence" to "mean[] any portion of a
sentence that is contained in the four comers of the sentencing document, including, but not limited
to . . [ftull payment of restitution . . [and] [full payment of fines or fees ordered by the court...."
FLA. STAT. § 98.0751(2)(a). While the legislation permitted a judge to "modify[] the financial
obligations of an original sentence," including "convert[ing] the financial obligation to community
service," the legislation made clear that "[t]he requirement to pay any financial obligation . . is not
deemed completed upon conversion to a civil lien." Id
145. See Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d at 1236 (describing the "straight party-line vote").
146. See MEADE, supranote 48, at 150 (observing that the legislative debate "revealed again the
sharp partisan divide that Amendment 4 seemed to have started to mend").
147. See Press Release, Quinnipiac Univ. Poll, Florida Voters Support Almost 4-1 Minimum
Wage Hike, Quinnipiac Poll Finds; Voters Split on Making Felons Pay Fines Before Voting (June 20,
2019), https://poll.qu.edu/images/polling/fl/fl06202019_fhcr21.pdf/ [https://perma.cc/8SVP-44RX].
148. During this window, people with felony convictions who owed outstanding fines and fees
were able to register to vote. See Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d at 1206 ("Under Florida law, the
amendment's effective date was January 8, 2019. Individuals with felony convictions began registering
to vote on that day. Supervisors of Elections accepted the registrations."); Id at 1208-11 (explaining
how multiple named plaintiffs who owe outstanding LFOs registered to vote in this period); Id at 1235
(noting that, at the time SB7066 was enacted, "felons with unpaid financial obligations" were "already"
"allowed to register and vote"); Id at 1229 ("SB7066 provides immunity from prosecution for those
who registered in good faithbetween January 8, 2019, when Amendment 4 took effect, and July 1, 2019,
when SB7066 took effect.").
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the right to vote as part of the prior, 2007 executive reform led by former
Governor Crist offers a similar opportunity.
To estimate the partisan consequences of felon disenfranchisement, I
gathered individual-level data on people convicted of a felony in Florida 49 and
people granted clemency.

50

Importantly, no previous paper has managed to

gather information on as many persons with felony convictions in the state or
who were granted clemency. Some studies have used easily accessible data on
persons released from state prison, 151 but these studies suffer from a significant
missing data problem: the vast majority of people who have been convicted of a
felony in Florida have never been to prison. 5 2 Although the records of people
who have been released from probation are no longer public record, I gathered
the data before this change in policy. As a result, my correctional dataset has
roughly 400,000 records of people released from state prison and 1.45 million

records of people who have been convicted of a felony but never been to prison.
Similarly, I gathered clemency records before a change in policy restricted public
access. For both of these reasons, this paper is able to present for the first time a
relatively complete picture of which persons with felony convictions in Florida
subsequently registered or voted, either because of the passage of Amendment 4
or because of Crist's earlier executive reform.1 53
B.

PoliticalPreferences

Figure 8 illustrates the breakdown in the party registration of people with
felony convictions. Each panel shows a relative percentage, such that within a
panel, the percentages sum to 100 percent. Importantly, a substantial number of
149.
150.

Appendix IV explains the data collection process and data available for correctional records.
Appendix V explains the data collection process and data available for clemency records.
151.
See, e.g., KEVIN MORRIS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THWARTING AMENDMENT 4, at 2
(2019) (acknowledging that, "[t]o be clear, this analysis includes only a slice of the population
4")
Amendment
by
enfranchised
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/2019_05_FloridaAmendment_FINAL-3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6B2U-PHHL]; see also Lawrence Mower & Langston Taylor, In Florida,the Gutting
of a Landmark Law Leaves Few Felons Likely to Vote, ELECTIONLAND FROM PROPUBLICA (Oct. 7,
2020), https://www.propublica.org/article/in-florida-the-gutting-of-a-landmark-law-leaves-few-felonslikely-to-vote [https://perma.cc/USG9-6L3D] (acknowledging that the analysis "excludes felons who
didn't serve time in a Florida prison or were released before 1997").
152. See Sarah K. S. Shannon, Christopher Uggen, Jason Schnittker, Melissa Thompson, Sara
Wakefield & Michael Massoglia, The Growth, Scope, and Spatial Distributionof People with Felony
Records in the United States, 1948-2010, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 1795, Online Resource 3 (2017),
https://read.dukeupress.edu/demography/article/54/5/1795/167743/The-Growth-Scope-and-SpatialDistribution-of#supplementary-data [https://perma.cc/QM8Z-95Y4] (estimating Florida had 1,818,825
people with felony convictions in 2010, of which only 307,655 people were previously in prison).
153. Appendix VI develops a general methodology to match individuals across lists using their
full name and date ofbirth, including estimating the degree of uncertainty of the total number of matches.
I used this methodology to merge the correctional data with the clemency data and then to merge both
the combined dataset and a subset of the clemency dataset limited to Crist's executive reform with the
statewide voter file. Table A.8 and Table A.9 indicate the strength of each match to the voter file, for
the initial Amendment 4 registrations and the Crist registrations, respectively, while Table A. 11 and
Table A.12 use a permutation test to show that there were very few false matches.
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people in Florida, with and without felony convictions, register to vote without
selecting a party affiliation. The figure identifies these registrations by shading
them a lighter color and labelling them "NPA." Rather than assume that half of
these unaffiliated registrants would support Democrats and half would support
Republicans, the figure uses the partisanship of people with felony convictions
who did register with a major party to predict the partisanship of those who did
not. 154

The left panel of Figure 8 focuses on the best estimate
of initial
Amendment 4 registrations, from the effective date of the amendment until about
a month before the effective date of the implementing legislation. The right panel
focuses on the best estimate of registrations from persons automatically granted
clemency by former Governor Crist.

154.
Specifically, I estimate the total number of unaffiliated registrants who would be likely to
support each major party based on the proportion of two-party registration among persons with felony
convictions by race and county. I do not predict the partisanship of the small number of registrants
affiliated with a minor party. The percentage of minor party registrants are shown in Figure 8, but
without a label.
155. The best estimate focuses on people who were previously in the custody of the Florida
Department of Corrections and for whom there is no indication that either their adjudication was
withheld, their conviction was for a misdemeanor, or they were subsequently granted a still-valid
clemency. Because these variables may be measured with error, and because people with felony
convictions whose eligibility does not legally stem from Amendment 4 may nonetheless believe it does,
I also calculated all possible Amendment 4 registrations, defined as people with felony convictions who
registered on or after Amendment 4's effective date. Table A.10 shows both measures of initial
Amendment 4 registrations.
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Figure 8: Party of Registration of People with Felony Convictions
Crist Clemency Regis1ares
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Amendment 4 Registrarts
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Overall, the top-left panel shows that half of the people with felony
convictions (50 percent) who initially registered as a result of Amendment 4
registered as Democrats, while about one-quarter (24 percent) registered as

Republicans. Among those people who did not register with a party, there was
likely a slight Democratic advantage with an additional 14 percent of people
registering with no party affiliation but likely supporting Democrats and an

additional 10 percent of people registering with no party affiliation but likely
supporting Republicans. The remainder of the left panel shows a clear racial
divide in party affiliation. The vast majority of African Americans (77 percent)
registered as Democrats, while more than half of all other registrants either
registered as Republicans (42 percent) or were unaffiliated but likely
Republicans (18 percent).1 56

Particularly because there were only an estimated twelve thousand initial
Amendment 4 registrations from January through May 2019,151 it is important
156. For a recent survey of the politics of persons incarcerated which reaches a similar
conclusion, see Nicole Lewis, Aviva Shen & Anna Flags, What Do We Really Know About the Politics
of
People
Behind
Bars?,
MARSHALL
PROJECT
(Mar.
11,
2020),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/03/11/what-do-we-really-know-about-the-politics-of-peoplebehind-bars [https://penna.cc/86FY-9GEW] ("Overall, the survey responses reflect a diverse and often
contradictory set of beliefs from people who, should they ever get the right to vote, cannot be seen as a
single bloc.").
157. Table A.11 reports the absolute numbers of initial Amendment 4 registrations while Figure
A.5 visualizes the number of new registrations by day, using both the best estimate and an alternative
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to note that the right panel, which uses registrants whose voting rights Crist
restored, shows almost exactly the same breakdown of partisanship by race. The
reason that Crist registrants are overall more Democratic than initial Amendment
4 registrants is only partly because African Americans restored voting rights by
Crist are somewhat more Democratic. It is also because there are relatively more
African Americans in the population of Crist registrants than initial Amendment
4 registrants. But despite this difference, the two pools of voters-restored by
Amendment 4 and former Governor Crist-demonstrate similar political
preferences.
Table 4 confirms the overriding role of race in the political preferences of
people with felony convictions, above and beyond the effect of a criminal
conviction itself. It reports the results of a series of regressions that focus on the
party of registration among registrants in Florida, including those with and

without felony convictions. The dependent variable in each regression is whether
the registrant is a Democrat. To explain Democratic party preference, each

regression includes an indicator for whether a registrant had a prior felony
conviction based on three different measures: (1) registrants specifically restored
voting rights by Crist; (2) registrants specifically restored voting rights by

Amendment 4; and (3) all registrants previously in the Florida Department of
Corrections, either in prison or on supervision, and subsequently released,
including those who were granted clemency or who never lost their right to vote.
The first three columns report the raw difference in Democratic preference
between registrations with and without a felony conviction according to each
measure of prior felony conviction. Among all three measures, people with
felony convictions are between 10 and 18 percent more likely to register as
Democrats than people without felony convictions, before accounting for any
difference in demographics.
Table 4: Effect of Felony Conviction on Party of Registration
Dependent Variable:
Model:
Variables
Prior Felony Conviction

Crist Clemency
(1)

Amendment 4
(2)

0.181
(0.003)

0.129
(0.004)

Registered Democrat
Any Supervision Crist Clemency
(3)
(4)

0.101

0.040

0.001

0.027

(0.003)
0.417
(0.002)
-0.070
(0.0003)
-0.002
(0.00002)

(0.004)
0.417
(0.002)
-0.070
(0.0003)
-0.002
(0.00002)

(0.0008)
0.418
(0.002)
-0.070
(0.0003)
-0.002
(0.00002)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Male
Year of Birth De-Meaned

Fixed-Efects
Precinct

0.367

0.367

Any Supervision
(6)

(0.0008)

Black

(Intercept)

Amendment 4
(5)

0.367

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

No

No

No

&

estimate of Amendment 4 registrations. A subsequent analysis by ProPublica examining only persons
released from prison but covering a longer time period from January 2019 through October 2020
estimated that at least 31,400 people had registered to vote as a result of Amendment 4. See Mower
Taylor, supra note 151.
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The second set of three columns show that the bulk of this difference is, in
fact, attributable to demographics. Columns (4), (5), and (6) account for the role
of demographics in partisan preferences by including indicators for whether a
registrant is Black or is male as well as their year of birth relative to the average
year of birth and precinct. The precinct is used as a proxy for income because of
both the clustering of neighborhood home values and other unobserved
neighborhood-level differences, such as racial context.1 58 Overall, the difference
in Democratic preference between people with and without felony convictions
shrinks to between no difference at all and about 4 percent, once accounting for
race, gender, age, and precinct. As a result, the potential political consequences
of felon disenfranchisement reform will be shaped in large part by the racial
profile of those who stand to regain their right to vote.
Despite the importance of demographics in estimating political preferences,

the relevant demographic profile of those who stand to regain their right to vote
can be easily confused. Importantly, the racial profile of those in prison can be
dramatically different than the racial profile of those who are disenfranchised,
particularly in states that practice lifetime disenfranchisement. Figure 9
illustrates the divergence between the two measures in each state in 2016, before
Amendment 4 passed.1 59 In many states, African Americans make up a smaller

percentage of the total disenfranchised population than the prison population. In
Florida, for example, while about half of state prisoners in 2016 were Black,
Black Floridians made up only about one-quarter of those disenfranchised. Given
this difference, if the public or the media assumes that the racial composition of
those disenfranchised is the same as those in prison, they will overestimate the
potential Democratic gain from reform by obscuring the importance of more
conservative whites in the ranks of the disenfranchised.1 60

158. For example, while registrants identified as not Black in the voter file could be either
Hispanic or Caucasian, registrants in a particular precinct are more likely to be one or the other.
159. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 16 tbl.4 (reporting the two measures).
160. In fact, as further discussed in Part II.D, data constraints required Chris Uggen and Jeff
Manza to use the racial composition of state prisoners to approximate the racial composition of people
with felony convictions when estimating the partisan consequences of felon disenfranchisement. See
MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 30, at 62, 270-71.

1178

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 109:1141

Figure 9: Racial Composition of Disenfranchised Population by State

(2016)

Acrqi

C.

Turnou

Table 5 examines the turnout of people with felony convictions. The first
row estimates that about 11 percent of people who were automatically restored
voting rights under Crist's reform ultimately participated in the 2016 election.161
The depressed turnout rate is consistent with what I have found in other states
using a similar method of combining individual-level public records. For
example, the estimated 2012 turnout of people who had completed any term of
incarceration or supervision was about 13 percent in Iowa and North Carolina,
62
12 percent in Maine, 9 percent in Rhode Island, and 8 percent in New York.1

161. For additional quantities of interest, see infra Table A.12 (reporting party of registration and
turnout of Crist registrants).
162. See Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, The Politics of the Restoration of Ex-Felon Voting
Rights: The Case ofIowa, 10 Q.J. POL. Sci. 41, 72 tbl.6 (2015) (reporting the estimated turnout rates for
Iowa, Maine, and Rhode Island); Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, Do Voting Rights NotificationLaws
IncreaseEx-Felon Turnout?, 651 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 220, 232 tbl.3 (2014) (New
Mexico); id at 234 tbl.4 (North Carolina); id at 230 tbl.2 (New York). I summarized the turnout
estimates reported in prior work by taking the baseline turnout measure and subtracting the average
estimated error rate in measuring turnout.
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Table 5: Estimated Turnout of People with Felony Convictions
Turnout

State

Year

Florida

2016

10.7%

Iowa
North Carolina
Maine

2012
2012
2012

13.3%
12.6%
11.5%

Rhode Island
New York

2012
2012

9.1%
8.2%

People with felony convictions may vote at a low rate, at least in part,
because they are more likely to be young, less educated, and a minority, all of
which are correlated with reduced participation. But turnout may be even lower
than predicted by demographics alone because contact with the criminal justice
system depletes trust in government. Consistent with this theory, political
scientists Amy Lerman and Vesla Weaver have shown that survey respondents
who report more contact with the criminal justice system also report reduced
political participation.1 63 However, more recent work which leverages variation
in sentencing in administrative data has suggested that the causal effect of
incarceration on voting is minimal.1 64

Another partial explanation is that confusion is a significant culprit for the
turnout gap between demographically similar people with and without felony
convictions. In previous work with Marc Meredith, I have shown that Iowans
with felony convictions who are provided notice about their eligibility to vote
are about one-third more likely to vote than their peers who were also restored
voting rights but were not notified.1 65 This suggests that the converse might also
be true: misinformation could decrease turnout. In line with this, a few audit
studies have found that local election officials can play a disruptive role in
administrating felon disenfranchisement policies.1 66

163. See Vesla M. Weaver & Amy E. Lerman,PoliticalConsequencesof the CarceralState, 104
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 817, 830 fig.3 (2010) (estimating a 4-percentage point reduction in turnout between
self-reported drug users who had been convicted at the time of the survey and self-reported drug users
who had not been convicted at the time but subsequently were convicted).
164. See Alan S. Gerber, Gregory A. Huber, Marc Meredith, Daniel R. Biggers & David J.
Hendry, Does IncarcerationReduce Voting? Evidence About the PoliticalConsequences of Spending

Time in Prison, 79 J. POL. 1130, 1144 tbl.6 (2017) (estimating the effect of incarceration on voting is
about half of a percentage point).
165.
See Meredith & Morse, The Politics of the Restoration of Ex-Felon Voting Rights, supra
note 162, at 63 fig.2, 66 tbl.4 (estimating that the effect of notification on turnout is about 6 percentage
points, while baseline turnout without notification is about 15 percent).
166. See Jessie Allen, Documentary Disenfranchisement, 86 TUL. L. REV. 389, 417 (2011)
(reporting that about half of the local election boards in New York inaccurately reported the conditions
under which voting rights could be restored); ALEC EWALD, SENT'G PROJECT, A 'CRAZY-QUILT' OF
TINY PIECES: STATE AND LOCAL ADMINISTRATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT
LAW i (2005), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/A-Crazy-Quilt-of-TinyPieces-State-and-Local-Administration-of-American-Criminal-Disenfranchisement-Laws.pdf
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Trump Won Florida, But Not Because of Felon Disenfranchisement

The administrative data now available on the registration and turnout of
people with felony convictions should lead us to revise the political
consequences of felon disenfranchisement reform. Before Amendment 4 passed,
some election analysts had speculated about the partisan consequences of such
reform.1 67 Had people who had completed any period of prison or supervision

been allowed to participate in 2016, the story went, their votes would have wiped
out President Trump's victory. This recalled the initial claim by Chris Uggen and
Jeff Manza that, but for felon disenfranchisement, Al Gore would have won
Florida and become President.1 68 Perhaps after Amendment 4 passed, the Florida
state legislature was considering these same scenarios.
Uggen and Manza used national survey data from the public and applied it
to the demographic profile of those incarcerated to estimate the political
consequences of felon disenfranchisement. Their method suggested that about
69 percent of people with felony convictions would have supported Democrats
in 2000.169 Based on Figure 8, above, Uggen and Manza's estimate is largely

consistent with the data in Florida, although it obscures the fact that party
preference varies largely as a function of race. However, the Uggen and Manza
method consistently overestimated turnout. For example, the method suggests
that 27 percent of people with felony convictions would have voted in 2000.170
But the Crist results in Florida and administrative data collected elsewhere
consistently show that people with felony convictions turn out less than half as
often as demographics predict.
Importantly, the data collected here suggest that Republicans should not
fear a "blue wave" from supporting robust reform, at least to the extent that the
analogy suggests a massive turn towards Democrats. Table 6 imagines various

counterfactual scenarios: had all of the estimated 1.48 million' 7 ' people in
Florida who had completed any period of prison or supervision been eligible to
vote, how many additional votes would they have generated for Democrats?
Depending on the assumptions used for Democratic preference and turnout, 72

Democrats would have gained between about twenty thousand to sixty thousand
additional votes. This would not have wiped out President Trump's 113,000-vote

[https://perma.cc/2GTM-M7A7] (reporting that more than one-third of one hundred local election
officials across ten states stated a central aspect of the law incorrectly).
167. See, e.g., Nate Cohn, A Blue Florida'? There Are No Quick Demographic Fixes for
Democrats, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/upshot/a-blue-floridathere-are-no-quick-demographic-fixes-for-democrats.html [https://perma.cc/XA6C-2MZ2].
168. See MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 30, at 191-92 (making the claim); id at 275 tbl.A8.1
(showing how they arrived at the claim).
169. See id
170. See id at 275 tbl.A8.1.
171. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 15 tbl.3 (reporting estimates of disenfranchisement by
state and overall).
172. For estimated party preference, see supra Figure 8, and for estimated 2016 turnout of Crist
registrants, see supra Table 5 (overall turnout); infra Table A.12 (turnout by race).
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margin of victory in 2016.173 But the difficulty with these exercises is that the
2000 election was determined by just 537 votes.

74

The estimation exercise is

helpful
primarily because
it underscores
how reforming
felon
disenfranchisement would not lead to a wholesale partisan realignment of the
state. The fact that some razor-thin elections may or may not go the other way
does not indicate otherwise. Rather, the net vote gain should be understood in
relation to the more than 9.5 million ballots cast in 2016.175 The estimated
Democratic gain from a more inclusive democracy is equal to roughly one half
of one percent of all ballots cast in the election.1 76
Table 6: Counterfactual Democratic Margin

[

Grist 10.7%

60,741

1

Population (2016)
|Number
Type
Overall
1,487,847

2

Overall

1,487,847]

Crist

3

Black
Not Black

418,224
1,069,623

4

Black
Not Black

418,224
1,069,623

173.
DEP'T

|

Preference
|Dem.
Source
Amendment 4 63.3%

]

|
lRp.
33.8%

Turnout (2016)
Source |Turnout
Crist
10.7%

Dem. Margin

|Subset |Total
46,850

68.8%

30.6%

C

Amendment 4

94.0%
36.3%

4.1%
60.0%

Crist
Crist

13.1%
9.2%

49,228
-23,398

25,830

Crist

96.2%
45.4%

3.6%
53.6%

Crist

13.1%
9.2%

50,750
-8,126

42,623

Crist

See November 8, 2016 GeneralElection OfficialResults Presidentofthe UnitedStates, FLA.
OF

STATE,

DIV.

OF

ELECTIONS,

https://results.elections.myflorida.com/DetailRpt.Asp?ELECTIONDATE=11/8/2016&RACE=PRE&
PARTY=&DIST=&GRP=&DATAMODE= [https://penna.cc/QAL3-H87J]. I previously made an
abbreviated version of this argument in the run-up to the November 2018 election. See Marc Meredith
& Michael Morse, Why Letting Ex-Felons Vote Probably Won't Swing Florida, VOX (Nov. 2, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/11/2/18049510/felon-voting-rights-amendment-4-florida
[https://perma.cc/EG7G-EM77]. Similarly, Traci Burch has disputed Manza and Uggen's initial claim
about the 2000 election, arguing that Bush would still have won Florida in 2000, even without felon
disenfranchisement, both because of "[u]ntenable assumptions about the political participation of exoffenders" and because "the majority of ex-felons in Florida are white men," who are more likely to
support Republicans. Traci R. Burch, Did DisenfranchisementLaws Help Elect PresidentBush? New
Evidence on the Turnout Rates and CandidatePreferencesof Florida'sEx-Felons, 34 POL. BEHAV. 1,

3(2012).
174.
DEP'T

See November 7, 2000 GeneralElection OfficialResults Presidentofthe UnitedStates, FLA.
OF
STATE,
DIV.
OF
ELECTIONS,

https://results.elections.myflorida.com/DetailRpt.Asp?ELECTIONDATE=11/7/2000&RACE=PRE&
PARTY=&DIST=&GRP=&DATAMODE= [https://perma.cc/3TTD-7JE4].
175. See November 8, 2016 General Election Official Results Voter Registration and Turnout,
FLA.

DEP'T

OF

STATE,

DIV.

OF

ELECTIONS,

https://results.elections.myflorida.com/TumoutRpt.asp?ElectionDate=11/8/2016&DATAMODE=
[https://perma.cc/XW52-UKJZ].
176. When President Trump won Florida inthe 2020 presidential electionby approximately three
hundred seventy thousandvotes, or 3.4 percentage points, the campaignwas reportedly happy that newly
enfranchised people with felony convictions did not make the difference because a tight race would have
further fueled "acrimony and partisanship." Lawrence Mower, Florida'sNew Felon Voters Didn't
Decide Tuesday's Election. Advocates Are Happy About That, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Nov. 6, 2020),
https://www.tampabay.com/news/florida-politics/elections/2020/11/06/floridas-new-felon-votersdidnt-decide-tuesdays-election-advocates-are-happy-about-that/ [https://penna.cc/F3WL-J88W].
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III.
THE ENSUING LITIGATION: ESTIMATING THE BURDEN OF FINES & FEES

The ACLU challenged the Republican legislation limiting Amendment 4
hours after it went into effect.1 77 In response, Republican officials claimed they
were merely implementing the campaign's own representations.1 78 The state

supreme court did ultimately find that the campaign intended to restore voting
rights only upon the payment of fines, fees, and restitution-collectively known
as LFOs-and that the plain text of Amendment 4 compelled such an
interpretation. 7 9 But the Republican state legislature went further than the
campaign in defining the "completion of all terms of sentence." For example, the
implementing legislation defined "all terms of sentence" to include fines and fees
converted to a civil lien, which the campaign had not addressed.1 80 In Florida,
judges routinely convert LFOs to civil liens when "the defendant is unable to
pay,"181 so requiring the payment of civil liens was a sure way to extend
disenfranchisement.
Regardless of whether the requirement to pay LFOs is better viewed as the
result

of voter suppression or campaign

strategy,

various

civil

rights

organizations claimed that selectively restoring voting rights based on the
payment of LFOs was unconstitutional. Both the Ninth Circuit and the Sixth
Circuit had previously rejected similar challenges in 2010.182 These opinions
established that state laws which condition the restoration of voting rights on the
payment of LFOs should be evaluated under a deferential rational basis
177. See Patricia Mazzei, FloridaLimits Ex-Felon Voting, Prompting a Lawsuit and Cries of
PollTax,' N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/28/us/florida-felons-votingrights.html [https://perma.cc/E43H-JWRR]; see also Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1203-05
(N.D. Fla. 2020) (describing how the five lawsuits eventually consolidated), rev 'd and vacatedsub. nom.
Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 2020).
178. See, e.g., Mazzei, supra note 177 (quoting Governor DeSantis defending the law by
referencing the campaign's earlier representation to the state supreme court); see also Kousser Report,
supra note 32, at 19-51 (summarizing and analyzing the "faithful steward" argument).
179. See Advisory Op. to Governor Re: Implementation of Amend. 4, The Voting Restoration
Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070 (Fla. 2020).
180. FLA. STAT. § 98.0751(2)(a); Jonesv. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1236 (N.D. Fla. 2020)
(explaining that "it cannot be said that on the subject of civil liens, SB7066 simply followed Amendment
4"), rev'd and vacatedsub. nom. Jonesv. Governor of Fla. 975 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 2020) (enbanc). In
fact, buried in the hundreds ofpages produced by the statewide estimating conference afterthe campaign
collected 10 percent of the necessary petitions to qualify for the ballot is a letter from the general counsel
of the Office of State Courts Administrator in which he offered the position that "[a]ny outstanding civil
judgment would . . not [be] part of the 'sentence' for purposes of the proposed constitutional
amendment." E-mail from Thomas A. "Tad" David, General Counsel, Off. of the State Cts. Adm'r, to
Amy Baker, Coordinator, Off. of Econ. & Demographic Rsch. (Oct. 20, 2016), in FIN. IMPACT
ESTIMATING CONF., FLA. OFF. OF ECON. & DEMOGRAPHIC RSCH., NOTEBOOK FROM THE FORMAL

CONF. OCT. 26 AND 27, 2016, at 409, 409 (2016), http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/constitutionalamendments/2018Ballot/VRANotebook3_10-27-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3B9-USQ5].
181.
Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d at 1235.
182.
See Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742
(6th Cir. 2010); see also Madison v. State, 163 P.3d 757 (Wash 2007) (state supreme court reaching
same conclusion).
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standard-both because of a doctrinal distinction between the right to vote,
which is fundamental, and the restoration of that right, which is not, and because
poverty is generally not considered a suspect class. 8 3 The courts had "little
trouble" finding such a rational basis.1 84
The plaintiffs' hopes for judicial relief largely depended on presenting new
empirical evidence about the burden of fines, fees, and restitution. Both the Ninth
Circuit and the Sixth Circuit decisions were made with limited evidence
available about the "type, burden, and disparate impact of criminal debt," 185
including no expert testimony on the issue. Importantly, Justice O'Connor,
sitting by designation on the Ninth Circuit, had explicitly left some room for
rational basis relief based on such evidence, noting that "[p]erhaps withholding
voting rights from those who are truly unable to pay their criminal fines due to
indigency would not pass this rational basis test," although the plaintiffs in that
case had not alleged they were indigent. 186
The campaign notably did not join the lawsuit.1 87 Nonetheless, the
empirical burden of fines and fees on people with felony convictions also
informs an evaluation of the campaign's strategy. While the campaign's decision
to not explicitly address the status of outstanding LFOs in the text of Amendment
4 may have been the result of a tradeoff necessary to ensure supermajority
support, there is at least some indication in the campaign's statements that it was
unaware of both the magnitude of LFOs and the number of people affected.1 88
183.
See Harvey, 605 F.3d at 1079 ("[W]e do not apply strict scrutiny as we would if plaintiffs
were complaining about the deprivation of a fundamental right."); Johnson, 624 F.3d at 746 ("[B]ecause
Tennessee's re-enfranchisement law neither implicates a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class,
the district court properly applied rational basis review, not strict scrutiny, to Plaintiffs' equal protection
challenge.").
184.
Harvey, 605 F.3d at 1079; accordJohnson, 624 F.3d at 747-48.
185. Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, DiscretionaryDisenfranchisement: The Case of Legal
FinancialObligations, 46 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 309 (2017).
186. Harvey, 605 F.3d at 1080.
187. The campaign instead submitted an amicus brief in support of neither party to the district
court, see Brief of Florida Rights Restoration Coalition as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party
with Respect to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284
(N.D. Fla. 2019) (No. 4:19-cv-300), and an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs to the Eleventh
Circuit, see Brief of Amicus Curiae Florida Rights Restoration Coalition in Support of PlaintiffsAppellees, Jones v. Govemor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 2020), 2020 WL 4698622.
188. For example, in 2018, more than three years after the campaign finalized its ballot language,
an internal memorandum from the vice chair of the campaign and the director of the Sentencing Project
stated there were "no good estimates" on the number of Floridians with felony convictions who had
outstanding fines and fees. See Simon-Mauer Memorandum, supra note 123. Further, the campaign
routinely promoted that Amendment 4 would restore the right to vote for 1.4 million people with felony
convictions even though this figure only represented the number of people with felony convictions who
had finished any term of prison or supervision and did not account for the number of people who
continued to owe LFOs. Compare id with Press Release, Second Chances Florida, Voting Restoration
Amendment Qualifies for November Ballot (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.aclufl.org/en/pressreleases/voting-restoration-amendment-qualifies-november-ballot [https://perma.cc/KGB5-LP9L]. To
be fair, Amendment 4 was drafted beginning in 2013, before most of the legal and academic community
turned their attention to the explosion in LFOs. Still, the Brennan Center for Justice had written a report
specifically warning about the "hidden costs" of Florida's criminal justice fees in 2010. REBEKAH

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

1184

[Vol. 109:1141

To assess both the plaintiffs' legal claims and the strategy for reform, I
collected administrative court records for felony cases in Florida. The aggregate,
statistical evidence strongly suggests that most people with felony convictions
in Florida owe fines and fees and are unable, not unwilling, to pay their debt.
Although the plaintiffs had some initial success in federal court presenting
substantially similar facts, the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, ultimately
"relegated [the empirical assessment] to the dustbin."1 89 As a result, despite
Amendment 4, the vast majority of people with felony convictions in Florida
remain ineligible to vote.
A.

The Growth and Scope of Fines and Fees

The growth and scope of LFOs across the United States is difficult to
document, in large part because of the decentralized nature of the criminal justice
system. To quantify the obstacle of fines and fees to the restoration of voting
rights in Florida, I took advantage of the fact that Florida has a unified court
system, although not all counties fully participate in it. After a series of public
information requests, I collected administrative court records for each felony
case in twenty-seven of Florida's sixty-seven counties since the year 2000,

including information on the total amount of combined fines and fees assessed
and the current total balance owed.1 90 The data do not consistently include
restitution, so all analyses are limited to fines and fees.191 Nonetheless, the
administrative data reveals that the Republican legislation will likely lead many
people with felony convictions to be too poor to vote.
1.

Fines and Fees per Case

Table 7 reports the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the distribution of
fines and fees assessed in total and the current balance remaining for all cases in
my dataset. It shows that, overall, across more than four hundred thousand felony
cases, the median felony case resulted in about $815 in fines and fees and has a
current balance of $667.192 Further, 80 percent of cases have some remaining

balance.

DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF FLORIDA'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES

(2010),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_The%20Hidden-CostsFlorida%27s-Criminal-Justice-Fees.pdf [https://penna.cc/CH8D-M85X].
189. Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016, 1066 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (Jordan, J.,
dissenting).
190. Appendix VIII details the data collection process. Table A.13 validates the data by
comparing it to aggregate information published in annual reports. While my data does not separate
fines from fees, "[fJines are imposed in a minority of cases" in Florida. Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp.
3d at 1206.
191. See Mower, supra note 114 (explaining that "[n]o one tracks restitution").
192. For comparison, Alexes Harris, Heather Evans, and Katherine Beckett looked at the 3,366
felony cases sentenced in Washington State during January and February 2004 and found that the
median felony resulted in $1,347 in LFOs. See Alexes Harris, Heather Evans & Katherine Beckett,
DrawingBloodfrom Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary UnitedStates, 115
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Table 7: Fines and Fees by Case

#

Cases

400,577

Percentile
Amount Due
Balance Remaining
75th
25th 50th
75th
25th 50th

$618

$815

$1,166

$100

$667

$940

Cases with
Balances

80%

While Table 7 aggregates information across all cases, Figure 10 shows
that the median amount assessed has increased over time, more than doubling
from about $475 in 2000 to a peak of about $935 in 2011.193 The legend at the

bottom of the figure shows how the scale of each point is proportional to the
number of observed cases.
Importantly, these fines and fees reflect a budgeting decision about how to
fund the court system. The sharp change in the amount of fines and fees assessed
in the mid-2000s corresponds to a state constitutional amendment1 94 governing

the funding of the state court system that marked a "fundamental shift" for
county clerks "from county funding to being a self-funded office."1 95 Of
particular significance is the fact that Jon L. Mills, the lawyer who helped draft
Amendment 4 and represented the campaign at the state supreme court, was one

of the co-sponsors of the court-funding amendment.1 96 At the time, Mills
embraced a fee-centric model of justice and suggested funding the court system
by raising fees.1 97

The Florida state legislature has enacted a litany of statutory fees that are
mandatorily imposed by the judge at sentencing, such as $100 for the "cost of
prosecution," $50 for a "public defender application fee," $225 for "additional
AM. J. SOC. & SOCio. 1753, 1774 tbl.5 (2010). My prior work collected a random sample of roughly 1
percent of felony court records in Alabama and found that the median felony resulted in about $2,000
in LFOs in 2005. See Claire Greenberg, Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, The Growing and Broad
Nature of Legal FinancialObligations: Evidencefrom Alabama Court Records, 48 CONN. L. REV.
1079, 1104 fig.4a.1, 1105 fig.4a.2 (2016). One reason that the overall amount assessed in Florida is
lower than what was found in Alabama or Washington State is that both of those studies also included
restitution. In Alabama, for example, about one-quarter of all LFOs assessed were estimated to be for
restitution. See Meredith & Morse, DiscretionaryDisenfranchisement, supra note 185, at 323 fig. 1.
193.
Similarly, the median amount of LFOs assessed in felony cases in Alabama doubled
between 1995 and 2005. See Greenberg et al., supra note 192, at 1105 fig.4A.2.
194. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 14.
195.
FILING

FLA. CT. CLERKS & COMPTROLLERS, DISTRIBUTION SCHEDULE OF COURT-RELATED
FEES,
SERVICE
CHARGES,
COSTS
AND
FINES
2
(2020),

https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.flclerks.com/resource/resmgr/advisories/advisories_2021/21bul1005_Att
ach_2_2020_Dist.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BPJ-RNVP]; see also MATHEW MENENDEZ, MICHAEL F.
CROWLEY, LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN & NOAH ATCHISON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE STEEP COSTS

OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES AND FINES 39 (2019) (describing how "[t]he shift toward reliance on court
fee collections came with a 1998 amendment to the Florida Constitution"); DILLER, supra note 188, at
5-6 (compiling legislative action expanding court-related debt).
196.

See Daniel Rivero, Co-Author and Attorney for Florida'sAmendment 4 Helped Create

Statewide Fines andFees Policy, WLRN (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.wlm.org/post/co-author-andattomey-floridas-amendment-4-helped-create-statewide-fines-and-fees-policy [https://perma.cc/BP93UST2].
197.
Id
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court costs," and at least $100 more for various "crime prevention," "crime

compensation," and "crime stoppers" funds, in addition to any local fees tacked
on. 198

Figure 10: Median Fines and Fees Assessed by Year
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The amount of fines and fees is staggering when the estimated average
annual income of people with felony convictions is likely less than $25,000, and
the estimated income of those formerly incarcerated is dramatically less.1 99
While the court data cannot distinguish between whether any particular
individual is unable versus unwilling to pay, the fact that individuals who do not
pay can already face a range of sanctions, from a driver's license suspension to

198. See DILLER, supra note 188, at 27-33 (listing specific fines and fees); see also Jones v.
DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1206-07 (N.D. Fla. 2020) (discussing some of these fines and fees),
rev'd and vacatedsub nom. Jones v. Govemor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 2020) (enbanc).
199.
See TERRY-ANN CRAIGIE, AMES GRAWERT & CAMERON KIMBLE, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST., CONVICTION, IMPRISONMENT, AND LOST EARNINGS: HOW INVOLVEMENT WITH THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
SYSTEM
DEEPENS
INEQUALITY
15
tbl.3
(2020),

https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/EconomicImpactReportpdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZC4H-YVLT] (estimating the average earnings of people with felony convictions as
about $23,000 and the average earnings of formerly incarcerated people as about $6,700 based on the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth); see also BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN

AMERICA 116 tbl.5.2 (2006) (estimating the average annual earnings of persons at age 27 before
incarceration as about $13,000 in 2004 dollars (about $18,000 in 2021 dollars) and after incarceration
as between $7,000 to $10,000 in 2004 dollars (about $10,000 to $14,000 in 2021 dollars) based on the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth).
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the revocation of supervision,200 at least suggests that many are too poor to pay

these financial obligations.
Figure 11, Figure 12, and Figure 13 highlight the pattern of stubborn debt
by focusing on the balance remaining in each case.
In Figure 11, the bars illustrate the relative percentage of cases sentenced
each year in which all fines and fees have been paid, some fines and fees have
been paid, or no fines and fees have been paid. Together, the dark grey and light
grey bars indicate the percentage of cases from that year with a remaining
balance today. While Table 7 reports that 80 percent of cases overall have a
remaining balance, this percent changes over time. The individuals in the vast
majority of recent cases in my dataset have paid no fines and fees at all. This
relative percentage decreases over time, presumably as people have more time
to pay and complete any period of incarceration or supervision. But even for

cases decided back in 2000, the white bar indicates that only one-quarter of cases
have no remaining fines and fees today.

75%RI

-

Figure 11: Relative Balance of Fines and Fees by Year
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a Sme pd
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One indicia of ability to pay is the time it takes to pay all fines and fees

assessed. Figure 12 and Figure 13 complement Figure 11 by examining when
individuals pay fines and fees over time, if they ever do. Both use the cases
sentenced in 2010 as an example. Figure 12 examines the 23 percent of cases
that year in which individuals paid all fines and fees, while Figure 13 examines

200. See, e.g., Jones v. De Santis, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1219 (N.D. Fla. 2019), rev 'd andvacated
sub. nom. Jones v. Govemnor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (describing Florida's
enforcement methods); DILLER, supra note 188, at 13-22 (explaining Florida's collection practices in
more detail).
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the 31 percent of cases in which individuals paid some. Individuals have made
no payments at all in the remaining 46 percent of cases decided that year.
Consistent with the theory that most individuals with outstanding fines and
fees cannot afford to pay their debt, Figure 12 shows that those cases with no
remaining balance today were paid off relatively quickly. The x-axis tracks the
time from the date of disposition to the date of last payment. About one-third of
fully-paid cases were paid within one year and about 70 percent were paid within
three years. In other words, if fines and fees are not paid off quickly, they are
unlikely to be paid at all. This suggests that the majority of the extant debt,
assessed years ago, is stubborn debt, unlikely to be paid back.
Figure 12: Time to Payback for Cases Sentenced in 2010
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Figure 13 shows that cases in which some, but not all, fines and fees have
been paid had little recent payment activity. The x-axis shows the time from the
last payment to today. In about two-thirds of cases, individuals made a payment
within three years of the sentence, but never paid again. As a result, because all
of the cases displayed were sentenced in 2010, the last payment in these cases
was seven or more years ago.
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Figure 13: Time Since Last Payment for Cases Sentenced in 2010

LII

Unsurprisingly given these payment patterns, the statewide association of

court clerks in Florida estimate that about 23 percent of all fines and fees assessed
in felony cases in 2018 is unlikely to ever be collected because the defendant is
indigent and about 8 percent is unlikely to ever be collected because the debts
have been converted to civil liens. 20 1

Although few people are able to pay off all of the fines and fees associated
with a given criminal case, Table 8 and Figure 14 show a distinct racial gap in

who has an outstanding balance. Because the assessments per case are not
significantly different by race, this racial gap is best understood as a wealth gap.
The two rows of Table 8 report the same information as in Table 7 but
broken down by the race of the defendant. 202 Although the amount assessed to
White and Black defendants is largely the same, the distribution of the balance
owed is quite different. Because most people, of any race, struggle to pay back

this debt, the difference in balance owed is only seen at the 25th percentile in the
distribution, where Black defendants still owe $368 while White defendants owe
just $25. In total, 86 percent of cases with a Black defendant have a remaining
balance, while 76 percent of cases with a White defendant do.

201.

See

FLA.

CT.

CLERKS

&

COMPTROLLERS,

2018

ANNUAL

ASSESSMENTS AND

COLLECTIONS REPORT 18 (2018), https://flccoc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/2018-AnnualAssessments-and-Collections-Report.pdf [https://penna.cc/F5DX-L4JK].
202. There are fewer total observations in Table 8 than Table 7 because defendants with an
inconsistent race over time or no race are dropped.
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Table 8: Fines and Fees per Case by Race
Percentile
Amount Due
Balance Remaining

#
Black Defendant

White Defendant

Cases
147,746
239,010

25th
$601
$628

75th
$1,095
$1,198

50th
$780
$818

25th
$368
$25

50th
$671
$648

75th
$953
$935

Cases with
Balances

86%
76%

Figure 14 shows the percentage of cases with outstanding fines and fees
based on the number of years since disposition and the race of the defendant. The
racial gap emerges quickly and grows over time as individuals with more means
have more opportunities to pay. For example, among all cases sentenced by

summer 2019, nearly every case has a remaining balance, Black or White. But
among all cases sentenced in 2010, cases with a Black defendant are about 12

percentage points more likely to have a remaining balance.
Figure 14: Cases with Balance Remaining by Year and Race
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Because disenfranchisement applies to an individual, not a case, case-level
data is ultimately limited in its ability to characterize the effect of conditioning
voting rights on the payment of fines and fees. To estimate the percentage of
people with felony convictions in Florida who owe fines and fees, Table 9

2021]

THE FUTURE OFFELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT REFORM

1191

aggregates all cases in my twenty-seven-county dataset associated with each
individual. 203
Table 9: Fines and Fees by Person
Percentile
Amount Due

# People
All Persons
Black Persons
White Persons

240,142
78,983
150,785

25th
$688
$716
$683

50th
$1,093
$1,162
$1,073

75th
$2,085
$2,235
$2,025

Balance Remaining

25th
$36
$366
$0

50th
$738

$865
$672

75th
$1,586
$1,854
$1,480

Persons with

Balances
76%
84%
73%

Overall, the first row of Table 9 shows that the median individual in my
dataset with at least one felony conviction was assessed $1,093 in fines and fees,
in contrast to the median felony which results in $815 in fines and fees. The caselevel racial disparity is prominent in the individual-level data too. Although
conditioning voting rights on fines and fees leaves the vast majority of people
with felony convictions disenfranchised, it disproportionately affects African
Americans. Table 9 shows that about 73 percent of White people with felony
convictions and 84 percent of Black people with felony convictions have
outstanding fines and fees. 204
Despite this pattern of legal debt, some critics have argued that even if the
majority of people with felony convictions are unable to pay their fines and fees,
many are uninterested in voting. To some extent, this argument draws support

from the generally low rates of observed registration and turnout, both in Florida
and across the country, among people with felony convictions.
Table 10 is the result of matching persons in the sentencing data with the
statewide voter file. 205 It shows that initial Amendment 4 registrants from the
twenty-seven counties in my sentencing dataset owed fines and fees at almost
the same amount and same rate as people with felony convictions in general.206
While Table 10 is informative of the extent of interest in voting, despite legal
debt, the data is most appropriate for its relative information on the composition
of Amendment 4 registrants by fines and fees owed, rather than an assessment
of the total number of such initial registrants. Nonetheless, under the definition
of "completion of all terms of sentence" adopted by the Republican legislature
203. Appendix VI describes the matching methodology, which was also used in Part II. See supra
note 158.
204. This is almost exactly the same pattern of debt observed in Alabama. See Meredith & Morse,
DiscretionaryDisenfranchisement,supra note 185, at 326 tbl.2 (reporting that 77 percent of people with
felony convictions in Alabama continue to owe LFOs, with a racial gap of 9 percentage points). It is also
consistent with the plaintiffs' expert in the litigation over the scope of Amendment 4. See Jones v.
Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016, 1066 (11th Cir. 2020) (enbanc) (Jordan, J., dissenting) (summarizing
that "of the over one million people convicted of a qualifying felony in Florida who have otherwise
completed the terms of their sentences, 77.4% owe some form of [LFO]").
205. Table A.14 details the high quality of the match.
206. Table A.15 shows that this distribution is roughly the same under a different, more capacious
definition of an Amendment 4 registrant that does not remove persons granted clemency, who had their
adjudication withheld, or who were convicted of a misdemeanor.
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and the Florida Supreme Court, the vast majority of initial registrations produced
by Amendment 4 will likely be removed from the voter rolls.
Table 10: Fines and Fees by Persons Initially Registered

All Registrants
Black Registrants
White Registrants

# Initial
Registrations
(27 of 67 counties)
2,315
1,099
1,194

B.

Percentile
Amount Due
Balance Remaining
25th 50th
75th 25th 50th 75th
$810 $1,447 $2,680
$40
$808 $1,902
$810 $1,447 $2,629 $308 $943 $1,996
$804 $1,444 $2,725
$0
$688 $1,770

Registrants with
Balances
77%
83%
71%

No DoctrinalIntervention

Approximately four months after the implementing legislation went into
effect, Judge Robert Hinkle of the Northern District of Florida found that the
plaintiffs had established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their
Equal Protection claim. He issued a limited preliminary injunction only as to the
named plaintiffs. 207 A panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
subsequently affirmed the district court's decision. 208
Following Justice O'Connor's earlier dicta, the Eleventh Circuit panel
suggested that Florida's scheme would be irrational as applied to the named
plaintiffs-because the plaintiffs alleged, and the district court found, they were
truly unable to pay their outstanding LFOs 209-and therefore may also be
irrational as applied to the whole class of people with felony convictions-if
those who were truly unable to pay "are in fact the mine-run of felons affected
by this legislation."2 1 0 However, in part because of the limited development of
the factual record as to the "mine-run felon," 21' the panel did not affirm the
preliminary injunction under rational basis review.2 1 2 Instead, the panel
embraced the sort of "doctrinal intervention" proposed by Beth Colgan 213 to
apply heightened scrutiny.21 4 The panel acknowledged that conditioning the
207. Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284 (N.D. Fla. 2019).
208. Jones v. Governor of Fla., 950 F.3d 795 (11th Cir. 2020).
209. See id at 810 ("If the question on rational basis review were simply whether the LFO
requirement is rational as applied to those unable to pay, we think it is clearly not.").
210. Id at 814; see also id at 816 ("In the absence of any fact-finding by the district court, and
on this limited record, we cannot say that the plaintiffs have carried their burden of establishing that a
substantial proportion of felons . . are indigent and, therefore, that the plaintiffs represent the mine-run

felon.").
211. Id at 815-16.
212. See id at 809-17 ("[W]e do not affirm the district court's preliminary injunction under a
rational basis review .... ").
213. See generally Colgan, supra note 8 (proposing a doctrinal intervention to dismantle
wealth-based penal disenfranchisement based on Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983) and related
cases). While Colgan's proposal would circumvent the traditional tiers of scrutiny, she recognized that
"lower courts and litigants including the parties in Bearden have attempted to shoehorn Bearden
into the traditional tiers [of scrutiny]." Id at 94 (citations omitted).
214. See Jones v. GovernorofFla., 950 F. 3d at 817-25 (justifying the application of heightened
scrutiny). The district courtbased its preliminary injunction in large part on a single footnote inJohnson
v. Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005), a prior Eleventh Circuit en banc case about
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restoration of voting rights on the payment of LFOs "does not neatly fit the
traditional categories that call for heightened scrutiny."2 But it reasoned that
"[b]ecause Florida's re-enfranchisement scheme directly implicates wealth
discrimination both in the administration of criminal justice and in access to the
franchise, we are obliged to apply some form of heightened scrutiny." 2 16
Following two strands of precedent set forth in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S.

660 (1983), and Harperv. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), the
panel had "little difficulty" holding Florida's scheme unconstitutional. 217
After an eight-day bench trial in which the plaintiffs put forth substantially
similar data to the data presented in Part IILA, 218 Judge Hinkle found "as a fact
that the overwhelming majority of felons who have not paid their LFOs in full,
but who are otherwise eligible to vote, are genuinely unable to pay the required
amount." 219 Judge Hinkle issued a permanent injunction, holding that Florida's
"pay-to-vote system" violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment "as applied to individuals who are otherwise eligible to vote but are
genuinely unable to pay the required amount," 220 under both heightened scrutiny
and rational basis review. 221 Importantly, the court constructed a simple remedy
for the Equal Protection violation, creating a rebuttable presumption that those
who had a public defender "in the last proceeding that resulted in a felony
conviction" were genuinely unable to pay. 222 Judge Hinkle further held that
Florida's practice of lifetime disenfranchisement. Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1301-03
(N.D. Fla. 2019). That footnote said:
The plaintiffs also allege that Florida's voting rights restoration scheme violates constitutional
and statutory prohibitions against poll taxes.... Under Florida's Rules of Executive
Clemency, however, the right to vote can still be granted to felons who cannot afford to pay
restitution.... Because Florida does not deny access to the restoration of the franchise based
on ability to pay, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendants on these claims.
Johnsonv. GovernorofFla., 405 F.3d at 1216-17 n.1. To the district court, this was "[t]he starting point
of the analysis of this issue, and pretty much the ending point" Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d at
1300. But the Eleventh Circuit panel "disagree [d] with the district court that [the] en banc decision in
Johnson controls the resolution of this case." Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 950 F.3d at 824. While the
district court briefly discussed how the Johnson footnote is "consistent with a series of Supreme Court
decisions," Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d at 1301, the Eleventh Circuit panel took on the bulk of
the work of justifying the application of heightened scrutiny.
215. Jones v. Governorof Fla., 950 F.3d at 808.
216. Id at 817.
217. Id at 827.
218. For the plaintiffs' expert Daniel Smith's reports, see Expert Report of Daniel A. Smith,
PhD., Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (No. 4:19-cv-300), 2019 WL 9077508; Supplemental
Expert Report of Daniel A. Smith, Ph.D., Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Fla. 2020) (No.
4:19-cv-300), 2017 WL 11539888; Second Supplemental Expert Report of Daniel A. Smith, PhD.,
Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 1196 (No. 4:19-cv-300), 2020 WL 3124393. The district court credited
this expert testimony in full. Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d at 1219 n.82.
219. Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d at 1219.
220. Id at 1250.
221. See id at 1219 (explaining that "the outcome [here] is the same regardless of whichapproach
to rational-basis scrutiny is applied").
222. Id at 1251.
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conditioning voting rights on the payment of court fees amounted to an
unconstitutional poll tax, in violation of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. 223 To
the extent there was a due process ruling, Judge Hinkle held that "[t]he
requirement to pay, as a condition of voting, amounts that are unknown and
cannot be determined with diligence is unconstitutional." 224
Based on the data presented in Part IILA, the district court's injunction,
issued in May 2020, likely would have made hundreds of thousands of people
with felony convictions in Florida eligible to vote in the November 2020
presidential election. Instead, the en banc Eleventh Circuit summarily stayed the
injunction, with no reasoning, 225 and subsequently reversed it, in the process
overruling the prior panel decision. 226
The en banc court's decision marked a quick return from a historic doctrinal
intervention to what has become standard jurisprudence. The en banc court
agreed with the Sixth and Ninth Circuits that rational basis was the appropriate
standard of review. 227 Importantly, in contrast to the functional approach of the
district court, which focused on the fact that Florida had "adopted a system under
which nearly a million otherwise-eligible citizens will be allowed to vote only if
they pay an amount of money," 228 the en banc court considered the restoration
of voting rights at a level of abstraction that made the district court's factfinding
irrelevant. In fact, the court held that the district court's factfinding on the
empirical burden of fines and fees "has no bearing" on the rational basis
inquiry. 229 Unmoored from the facts, the court "readily conclude[d]" that
Florida's classification survives scrutiny, explaining that "[t]he people of Florida
could rationally conclude that felons who have completed their sentences,

223. See Id at 1250.
224. Id The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, disagreed about whether the district court ruled on
the plaintiffs' procedural due process claim. See Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016, 1090 (11th
Cir. 2020) (en banc) (Jordan, J., dissenting) ("The majority says that the district court did not decide
whether Florida's reenfranchisement scheme violates the Due Process Clause. In my view, the district
court concluded that the LFO requirement violates due process.").
225. See McCoy v. Governor of Fla., No. 20-12003-AA, 2020 WL 4012843 (11th Cir. July 1,
2020), aff'd sub nom., Raysorv. De Santis, 140 S. Ct. 2600 (2020) (mem.).
226. See Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d at 1033 ("We . . overrule the contrary holding by
the panel in the earlier appeal from the preliminary injunction.").
227. See Id at 1032. The en banc court cabined the cases the district court relied on to justify
heightened scrutiny as either relating to extending imprisonment or to limiting access to judicial
proceedings based on inability to pay, not selectively restoring voting rights. See id ("The Supreme
Court has never extended Bearden beyond the context of poverty-based imprisonment."); id at 1033
("[T]his exception to rational basis review applies only when the State makes access to judicial processes
in cases criminal or quasi criminal in nature tun on ability to pay." (internal quotation omitted)).
228. Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d at 1203. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg
and Kagan, similarly explained when reviewing the initial stay of the district court's injunction that
"otherwise eligible voters [are prevented] from participating in Florida's . . election simply because
they are poor." Raysor v. DeSantis, 140 S. Ct. at 2600.
229. Jones v. GovernorofFla., 975 F.3d at 1037.
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including paying their fines, fees, costs, and restitution, are more likely to
responsibly exercise the franchise than those who have not." 230
The en banc court quickly disposed of the plaintiffs' other claims too. The
court held, as a matter of law, that because "[c]ourt fees and costs imposed in a
criminal sentence[,] . . . they are part of the State's punishment for a crime" and

thus "are not taxes." 23 1The court similarly summarily rejected the plaintiffs' due
process challenge, holding that it is enough that plaintiffs know they must pay
fines, fees, and restitution. 232
The jurisprudence of felon disenfranchisement must be updated to reflect
the reality of mass incarceration. Even if Florida may have an "interest
in restoring felons to the electorate after . .. they have been fully rehabilitated by
the criminal justice system,"233 it is at best unresponsive to claim that such an
interest is furthered by requiring the payment of significant amounts of fines and
fees by plaintiffs who are genuinely unable to pay them, as the district court
found. Further, it is a misstatement of the record that it "may at times be difficult"
to know exactly what LFOs are owed: 234 The district court found that "even with
a team of attorneys and unlimited time, the State has been unable to show how
much each plaintiff must pay to vote under the State's view of the law." 235
However, a full critique of the en banc decision is beyond the scope of this
project.236
While the consequences of the en banc decision were dramatic, the actual
vote was close. Six judges voted to reverse the district court, and four voted to
affirm, in three joint dissents, 237 with two judges recused 238 and two who voted
to reverse declining to recuse. 239 After an improbable campaign that captured the

230. Id at 1035.
231. Id at 1038.
232. Id at 1046-47.
233. Id at 1034.
234. Id at 1046.
235. Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1208 (N.D. Fla. 2020), rev'd and vacated sub.
nom Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 2020) (enbanc).
236. For one critique of the decision, see Recent Case, Jones v. Governor of Florida, 134 HARv.
L. REV. 2291, 2295 (2021) (arguing that "the court conflated the legislature's will with the people's and
mechanically applied a highly deferential standard").
237. See Jones v. GovernorofFla., 975 F.3d at 1059 (Martin, J., dissenting); id at 1065 (Jordan,
J., dissenting); Id. at 1107 (Pryor, J., dissenting).
238. Both Judge Brasher and Judge Rosenbaum recused. The plaintiffs sought to disqualify Judge
Brasher because of his prior participation in similar litigation as Solicitor General of Alabama, but he
instead explained his recusal as the result of the fact that the Alabama Attorney General had filed an
amicus brief in the instant case. The plaintiffs did not ask for Judge Rosenbaum's recusal and Judge
Rosenbaum did not explain her recusal.
239. The plaintiffs sought the recusal of Judges Lagoa and Luck because both had participated in
the state supreme court decision interpreting the language of Amendment 4 prior to being elevated to
the federal bench, butbothjudges declined to recuse. Jones v. Governor of Fla., No. 20-12003 (11th Cir.
July 27, 2020) (denying appellants' disqualification motion). Both voted to reverse Judge Hinkle's
permanent injunction. See Jones v. Governor ofFla., 975 F.3d at 1024.
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support of a supermajority of Florida voters, the en bane decision ultimately
broke down along predictable partisan lines. 240
CONCLUSION

The passage of Amendment 4 is part of a clear political trend towards the
re-enfranchisement of people with felony convictions. 241In fact, perhaps buoyed
by the victory and attention paid to Amendment 4 in Florida, California voters,
the Washington State Legislature, and the Iowa governor all recently expanded
the restoration of voting rights. 242 While the campaign's example of coalition
building offers an important strategic path to continue to reduce the extent of
felon disenfranchisement, particularly in Republican states with the most
disenfranchisement, the amendment's implementation and the subsequent
litigation also represent a cautionary tale. Despite Amendment 4, Florida
continues to disenfranchise more citizens than any other state. 243
As of 2020, about five million people could not vote because of a criminal
conviction.244 About one-quarter of people who are disenfranchised are in
prison; about one-third are on probation or parole; and slightly less than half have
completed any period of prison, probation, or parole 245-although, as the case of
Florida demonstrates, it obscures the role of LFOs to refer to these people as
having completed their sentence.
The future of reform must directly address the rise of fines and fees used to
fund the criminal justice system. 246 Although perhaps more empirical evidence
will persuade judges outside the Eleventh Circuit that no one should be too poor
to vote, 247 the roller coaster legal loss should not obscure the political
240. Perhaps suspecting a similar outcome at the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs never petitioned
for a writ of certiorari.
241. See Jones v. GovernorofFla., 975 F.3d at 1029 (making this observation);
Jones v. Governor of Fla., 950 F.3d 795, 801 & nn. 1-3 (11th Cir. 2020) (same); McLEOD, supra note 4
(cataloging reforms over time by state and year).
242.
See Disenfranchisementand Rights Restoration: Spotlight on States, APPEAL: POL. REP.,
https://theappeal.org/political-report/disenfranchisement-states/
[https://perma.cc/5M3N-E49U];
Daniel Nichanian, She Lost Her Right to Vote over a Felony. Now This Lawmaker Helped Enfranchise

Thousands, APPEAL: POL. REP. (Apr. 8, 2021), https://theappeal.org/politicalreport/washington-votingrights-tarra-simmons/ [https://perma.cc/N2DN-GWG2] (explaining how Washington State's first
formerly incarcerated legislator sponsored the successful bill).
243. See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 29, at 16 tbl.3 (reporting estimates of disenfranchised
individuals with felony convictions).
244. See id
245. See id at 8 fig.1 (reporting estimates of disenfranchisement across correctional populations);
id 16 tbl.3 (reporting estimates of disenfranchised individuals with felony convictions).
246. See generally Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the
CriminalizationofDebt, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 349, 349 (2012) (arguing that "for ex-felons in particular,
criminal justice debt can serve as an insurmountable obstacle to the resumption of voting rights and
broader participation in society").
247. The en banc precedent quickly led to the defeat of a similar effort by some of the same civil
rights organizations to challenge effectively the same practice in Alabama. See Thompson v. Merrill,
No. 2:16-cv-783, 2020 WL 7080308, at *22 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 3, 2020) ("[T]he distinction between
Florida's law, which requires completion of sentence which includes payment of money, and Alabama's
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opportunity, shown by Amendment 4, to extend the restoration of voting rights
with the public's support. In fact, during the litigation over the scope of
Amendment 4, the federal district court found that "voters would have approved
Amendment 4 by more than the required 60%" had they known it would have

restored voting rights regardless of any court fees owed, and, for those genuinely
unable to pay, regardless of any LFO. 248 The district court's finding is about the
predicted support of the public, not the intention of the campaign. But it suggests
an ambitious path forward for future reform-in Florida and throughout the
country.

One of the central reasons that the campaign was so successful at the ballot
box was that it played a crucial information-sharing role. It showed, with its
message and its outreach, that the vast scale of disenfranchisement has impacted
all sorts of communities, not easily defined by partisanship. A campaign
designed to specifically tackle wealth-based disenfranchisement should look
different. For example, it should retire the slogan "when a debt is paid, it's paid."
It should also adopt a thicker narrative of redemption. But to move beyond
embracing personal responsibility, advocates and researchers must continue to
educate the public and legislators alike on the labyrinth of unjust fines and fees
we have erected in this era of mass incarceration.
Voting rights advocates should also grapple with the criminalization of
poverty in the first instance, rather than just the collateral consequence of
continued disenfranchisement. State legislatures should eliminate court fees and
fund courts with tax dollars. The recent incorporation of the excessive fines
clause presents another opportunity to press for state-level reform. 249
To quote Desmond Meade, the campaign's chair and driving force,
"Amendment 4 accomplished what it was intended to do." 250 We should
celebrate its watershed victory-and use the lessons from the rise, fall, and legal
fight for Amendment 4 to continue the project of building a more inclusive
democracy.

law, which requires completion of sentence and payment of money imposed as part of that sentence,
does not distinguish this case from Jones H.").
248. Jones v. DeSantis, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1246 (N.D. Fla. 2020), rev'd and vacated sub.
nom. Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 2020) (enbanc); see also Recent Case, Jones
v. DeSantis, supranote 236, at 2297 ("It is . . hard to imagine the Floridians who voted to amend their
constitution did so intending to benefit almost no one.").
249. See Beth A. Colgan & Nicholas M. McLean, FinancialHardship and the Excessive Fines
Clause:Assessing the Severity ofPropertyForfeituresAfter Timbs, 129 YALE L. J. F. 430 (2020). There
are other, less ambitious, litigation opportunities too. For example, even if it is somehow not a violation
of Bearden to extend disenfranchisement for someone who is unable to pay LFOs, the Florida Supreme
Court held in 1991 that it is a violation of Bearden to collect those same LFOs. See State v. Beasley, 580
So. 2d 139, 142-43 (Fla. 1991).
250. MEADE, supranote 48, at 149.

